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ABSTRACT 
The right of control and access to New Zealand's fisheries 
resource has long been a subject of debate between Maori 
and Pakeha. Under Article II of the Maori version of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, te iwi Maori were promised te tino 
rangatiratanga or chieftainship over their taonga, which 
included the fisheries resource. Subsequent legislative 
and government action since the signing of the Treaty has 
undermined and in some cases denied this fishing right. 
The Taiapure provisions legislated by Part IlIA of the Maori 
Fisheries Act 1989 appear as an attempt to rectify previous 
policy decisions. They wish to recognise rangatiratanga 
and secure the fishing rights in relation to Article II of 
the Treaty. 
This study assesses whether the Taiapure provisions do in 
fact fulfill this objective, in policy terms and in terms 
of a te iwi Maori perspective. By applying an analytical 
framework, which exposes the underlying structural logic 
of the provisions and its inability to link with the surrounc 
context, and by taking a case study approach, which reflects 
te iwi Maori perspectives, the Taiapure provisions are shown 
to fall short of fulfilling their objective. Recommendation~ 
for rectifying this shortfall are then offered, and apractic 
option for the future is suggested as an 'ideal' for which 
to aim. 
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.~ __ .J 
PAGE 
GIDSSARY 
1.1 BACKGROUND ........................................... 
1.2 CURREN!' CLIMATE ....................................... 
1.3 PROBLEM AND STUDY OBJECTIVES •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
1. 4 S'IUDY .APPROACIl •••.•••••••••••••.•.•••.••.•••..••..•. 
2.1 INrR.OOIrrlOO ........................................ .-
2.2 HIs:IORlCAL aNrEX'r ................................... .. 
2.2.1 Treaty of waitangi 
2. 3 CURRENl' CONrE:X:'r ........................................... . 
2.4 
2.3.1 Resource User Groups ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
2. 3 • 2 Tribal System •••••••••..••••••.•••••.•.•.••.• 
2.3.3 Differing Perceptions •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
S{MIlARY 
rnAPrER 1lmEE - TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
3 .1 INrR.ooucrr ON ......................................... . 
3 • 2 WHAT IS A TAIAPURE? •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
3. 3 OBJECTIVES OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS •••••• 
3.4 PROCESS OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS •••••••• 
3.5 AGENCIES LINKED 'IO THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
3.5 CURRENl' CXJI'CCME 
3. 6 S{MIlARY .......................................................... .. 
4 .1 INrR.O~ION ........................................... . 
4.2 CIlOOSING THE ANALYTICAL TOOL ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
4.3 DESIGN APPROACH .......................................... 
4.4 ELEMENTS.AND LINKAGES OF POLICY DESIGN ••••••••••••• 
4.4.1 Objectives ............................................ 
4.4.2 Target EUpulations ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
4.4.3 Agents * *." .......................... . ......... 
4.4.4 '!boIs, Rules and Assumptions ••••••••••••••••• 
4.5 CONTEXTUAL CIlARACTERISTICS ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
i 
1 
4 
6 
7 
9 
9 
9 
12 
13 
15 
17 
19 
20 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
25 
26 
26 
27 
29 
30 
30 
30 
31 
31 
32 
5.1 INI"RODtJCrION ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 33 
5.2 CONTEXT OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS ••••••••.••••••••.••• 33 
5.2.1 Support for the Taiapure Provisions •••••••••••••• 34 
5.2.2 Knowledge and Certainty about Taiapure Provisions 36 
5.2.3 Motivation and capacity for Taiapure Provisions •• 37 
5. 2 4 Conclusion ••.••••...••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••• 38 
5.3 UNDERLYING SI'RUCI'URAL I1JGIC 0 •••• ,0, ••••••••••••••••••••• 39 
5.3.1 ()):)jecti ves ..•••••••...••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 39 
5.3.2 Target Populations ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 41 
5. 3. 3 ~ents and ~encies .••••.•••••••••••.•••••••••••• 41 
5.3.4 Linkages: Tbols, Rules and Assumptions ••••••••••• 43 
5.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS •••••••••••••••••• 45 
5.4.1 Role of Support in the Taiapure Provisions ••••••• 45 
5.4.2 Role of Knowledge and Certainty •••••••••••••••••• 48 
5.4.3 Role of Motivation and capacity •••••••••••••••••• 51 
5.4.4 Conclusions .•.••.••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••• 53 
0IAPl'ER SIX - CASE S'IDDIES 
6 • 1 INI"RODUCI'ION ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
6 • 2 .M"E'TIIOIX:>I1JGY ..............................,.............. 
6. 3 INl'ERVIEWS 
6. 4 OON'CI.,USION ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
55 
55 
58 
67 
7.1 ~USIONS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 69 
7. 2 RE~TION"S •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 70 
................................................... 74 
................................................... 75 
B,IBI,d~ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 a 
APPFNJIX am: THE TREATY OF WAITANGI .•••••••••••••.•.•••••• 82 
APP.fHJIX '.0«): TAIAPURE SECTION OF THE MAORI FISHERIES ACT •• 86 
APPENJIX TDREE: TAIAPURE APPLICATION PROCESS FI..CW DIAGRAM.... 88 
GLOSSARY 
Maori words and phrases utilised in the text are translated 
in this glossary. The translation has drawn upon the works 
of Ryan,P(1983), Tau,T et al (1990) and Williams,H (1985). 
hapu - sub-tribe, section of a large tribe 
iwi - tribe, people 
kaimoana - food from the sea 
kaitiaki - guardians, protector, caretaker 
kohanga - nest, maternity house 
mana - authority, influence, prestige 
mahinga kai - food and other resources, and the areas that 
they are sourced from 
manuhiri - visitors 
rangatira - chief 
rohe - boundary, district 
runanga - local representative groups. A Maori equivalent 
of local government formed to prQtect and defend 
the rangatiratanga, the tuurangawaewae, and the 
cultural and social values of their members 
Tangaroa - deity of the sea and fish and other marine life 
tangata whenua - people of the land, the people who hold 
the tuurangawaewae and the manawhenua 
in an area, according to tribal and hapu 
custom 
taonga - treasured possessions, includes both tangible and 
intangible treasures 
te iwi Maori - (a term used to denote the tribal aspect of 
Maori people) 
tikanga Maori - Maori traditions, customs, lore or law, the 
correct Maori way 
tuurangawaewae - a person's right to stand on a particular 
piece of land or in a certain place and 
to speak and be heard on matters affecting 
them and their relationships to that land 
and its resources 
urupa - places where Maori bury their dead, often enclosed 
waahi mahinga kai - food gathering places of extreme importance 
waahi tapu - places of sacred and extreme importance 
whakapapa - genealogy, genealogical relationship 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
This study seeks to examine the Taiapure provisions l , 
legislated by Part IlIA of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, 
which later became an amendment to the Fisheries Act 1983. 
The study is concerned with firstly, whether the provisions 
work in terms of their written objective, secondly, whether 
they work for iwi/hapu and thirdly, should they be shown 
to not work, what changes can be recommended. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
F6r the largest part of 152 years since the signing of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, the question of ownership and control 
of NZ's fisheries has been a subject of bitter argument between 
Maori and Pakeha. Historically, much of this argument sterns 
( from the promises that were made in the Treaty. The second 
article of the Maori version of the Treaty guaranteed to 
Maori 'te tino rangatiratanga' over their 'taonga'. Thi~ 
right has been denied to Maori through legislative and 
~overnment action from the early years after the signing 
of the Treaty until more recent years. The early legislation 
contained assumptions that were to permeate subsequent fishing 
laws. 
"The assumptions were basically that Maori fisheries were 
restricted, both as to the area of sea used and the species 
caught, that Maori fishing should be limited to supplying 
'for personal needs, and that fisheries could be managed 
by the state as though Maori had no sys,tems of their own." 
(Waitangi Tribunal,1988 p.xvi) 
':lri 1983, a major restructuring exercise for fi ,sheries was 
~ridertaken with the Fisheries Act. The Act was to "consolidate 
~,~nd ' reform the law relating to fisheries and fishery resources 
k .,. . . • j~Lthln NZ." It did not, however, provide greater provision 
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for Maori interests. Section 77(2) of the 1908 Act became 
section 88(2) of the 1983 Act and read; "nothing in this 
act shall affect any Maori fishing rights." Before the Fisheries 
Bill was passed, Section 88(2) was debated at length in 
parliament. The recognition that was once given to the Treaty 
of Waitangi in the Fish Protection Act, 1987 was emphasised 
and the protection that section 14 of the 1903 Fisheries 
Amendment Act and consequently the 1908 Fisheries Act had 
offered Maori was questioned. Several Maori members demanded 
that the Bill go back to select committee so that the Treaty 
could be a part of it. However, despite the protests, the 
bill was passed with no mention of the Treaty. 
The Fisheries Act 1983, not only neglected the Treaty of 
Waitangi, but it also stated that only 'commercial operators' 
could take fish for sale. Commercial operators were defined 
by the Director General of MAF as those who earned more than 
$10,000 a year or 80% of their total income from fishing. 
The result was that approximately half the number of fishers, 
something like 1500-1800 went out of business. Many who 
lost their licenses were Maori. (Law Commission,1989:17) 
Following the 1983 Act, the Fisheries department of the Ministry 
,of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF Fisheries) proposed the 
Quota Management System (QMS) as a method of conserving the 
seriously depleted fish stocks. At the core of this system 
was the concept of an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ). 
A quota is a property right that can be bought or sold on 
the market and in addition will attract a rental to the Crown. 
Maori tribes objected to these proposals as a matter of 
principle. Although the general conservation principles 
of the QMS were agreeable, the property rights aspect of 
the ITQ system was in general contrary to the guarantees 
in the Treaty. Despite a warning from the Maori tribes via 
the Waitangi Tribunal, the QMS was introduced in the Fisheries 
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Amendment Act 1986. 
ollowing the 1986 legislation, four Maori parties, the Ngai 
Tahu Maori Trust Board, Muriwhenua Incorporated, Tainui Maori 
Trust Board, and the New Zealand Maori Council (Aotearoa 
Fisheries Limited June 1991:22) sought a High Court 
declaration and injunction claiming that the QMS breached 
section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983. The Maori case 
relied on both Treaty rights and common law 'aboriginal rights'. 
Greig,J on behalf of the Court issued an injunction preventing 
the inclusion of certain species in the quota system. His 
judgement made it clear that Maori fishing rights extend 
to commercial activity, but it did not determine whether 
section 88(2) refers to aboriginal title or Treaty rights. 
This was left to be determined . by future High Court cases. 
The Court also ordered the Crown to negotiate a fisheries 
agreement with the Maori applicants. 
In response to the court decision, the government set up 
a "Joint Working Group on Maori Fisheries'. The working 
group failed to reach an agreement. Despite this, a Maori 
Fisheries Bill was introduced in Parliament later that year. 
The Bill was amended several times before being passed in 
December 1989 as the Maori Fisheries Act. 
to the developments of the Bill were legal proceedings 
in the High court, seeking to resolve the basic question 
of 'nature and extent' of the Maori fishing right. These 
proceedings were eventually reduced to two cases - those 
of Ngai Tahu and Muriwhenua. The hearings for these cases 
were adjourned "sine die" on the basis of an a ,rrangement 
with the Crown. 
"The arrangement was that both the Crown and Maori parties 
would step back from the litigation and give the provisions 
of the Maori Fisheries Act an opportunity to be put into 
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effect." (Aotearoa Fisheries Limited,June 1991:23) 
The purpose of the Maori Fisheries Act, as set out in its 
long title includes "the recognition of Maori fishing rights 
secured by the Treaty of Waitangi." The provisions of the 
Act can be found in four main parts. 
Part one of the Act establishes a Maori Fisheries Commisssion 
to ufacilitate the entry of Maori into, and the development 
by Maori of the business and activity of fishingn. The Maori 
Fisheries Commission receives a package of the Total Allowable 
Catch from the Crown over a transition period. At least 
50% of this quota must be transferred to Aotearoa Fisheries 
Limited. Aotearoa Fisheries Limited, set up in Part 2 of 
the Act, is a private company required to operate on "commerci 
principles ll • 
Part IlIa of the Act provides for 'Taiapure-Local fisheries' 
to be established where such areas have been of special 
significance to any iwi or hapu either as a source of food 
or for spiritual and cultural reasons. The written objective 
of the Taiapure provisions is to "provide for better recogniti 
of rangatiratanga and of the right secured in relation to 
fisheries by Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi. 1I The 
fourth part of the Act is concerned with the obligations 
of the Crown under the legislation. 
1.2 CURRENT CLIMATE 
In the three years since the Maori Fisheries Act was passed, 
several matters relevant to the recognition and practical 
realisation of the Maori fishing right have been undertaken. 
The Maori Fisheries Commission and its subsidiary company 
Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd, were duly set up and they have receive 
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7.5% of fishing quota from the government, with the final 
instalment of 2.5% coming in October of this year. Maori 
interests have acquired a further 12% of quota on the open 
market. The transfer of this quota to iwi is scheduled to 
take place after October 1992. The Maori Fisheries Commission 
after consultation with the various tribes has laid out a 
plan or formula for the transference of the quota. The 
Commission thinks that tikanga Maori, the customs and rules 
that govern Maori, should be the basis for sharing the quota 
to the tribes. (MFC Newsletter,1992:2) 
In August of 1991, the Minister of Fisheries appointed an 
independent Task Force to make recommendations on the future 
development of fisheries legislation and associated structure~ 
in New Zealand. Drafting of a new Fisheries Bill begins 
after final submissions on the Task Force's recommendations. 
The Bill should be ready for a first reading in Parliament 
by late October before it goes to a select committee. Fisherj 
Minister Doug Kidd intends to have the new legislation in 
place by October 1993. 
In August of 1992 the Waitangi Tribunal released its findings 
on the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries claim, saying that Ngai Tahu 
should be compensated for the loss of its 12-mile zone around 
most of the South Island and given rights to develop a 
"reasonable share" of the 200-mile economic zone. 
Following the release of the Waitangi report on the Ngai 
Tahu claim; the Crown and the Maori negotiators announced 
a deal to resolve the question of the Maori fishing right, 
that had been adjourned sine die to allow the Maori Fisheries 
Act to take effect. The deal, announced on the 27th August 
1992 and known as a 'memorandum of understanding' or 'Deed 
of Settlement', comprises the government putting up money 
allowing Maori to buy half of New Zealand's biggest fishing 
company, Sea lord Products Ltd. In return for this government 
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money, which will give Maori control of 40% of the $1.2 billiol 
fishing industry, the Maori negotiators have agreed to 
extinguish in law their statutory rights. That does not 
apply to traditional fishing rights which are not a commercial 
proposition. However phrased, this deal will be seen to 
have extensive ramifications for the area of Maori Fisheries, 
should it go ahead. If the deal cannot be made, the case 
to define Maori fishing rights will go back to court after 
the October 31 deadline. 
The current state of the Maori Fisheries equation is one 
of change and uncertainty, with the existing legislation 
being subject to reform and with deals such as the Deed of 
Settlement being made. Within this state of flux, the Taiapur 
provisions remain as they stand in the Fisheries Act 1983, 
for the time being at least. It is these provisions with 
which this study is concerned, and it addresses them with 
an awareness of the changes taking place in the Maori Fisherie 
context, yet undertakes an analysis with the situation as 
it stands in September 1992. 
1.3 PROBLEM AND STUDY OBJECTIVES 
Given the treatment of Maori fishing rights and rangatiratangc 
with fisheries law, this study seeks to examine a piece of 
legislation concerning traditional fishing rights - the TaiapL 
provisions. The study considers the sufficiency of the TaiapL 
provisions' design in relation to the problem of non-recogniti 
of rangatiratanga. Do they, unlike previous legislative 
provisions, recognise rangatiratanga and thus achieve their 
written objective? 
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The objectives of the study are to examine the following 
questions: 
1) Are the Taiapure provisions designed to achieve their 
objective? 
2) Do the Taiapure provisions recognise rangatiratanga 
from a te iwi Maori perspective? 
3) Should the Taiapure provisions be shown to not fulfill 
their objective, what recommendations might be made 
for change? 
1.4 STUDY APPROACH 
The first objective is met by applying an analytical fr~mework 
to the Taiapure provisions, which exist in a highly complex 
context. This context shall be considered and discussed 
at some length in Chapter Two. Chapter Three follows with 
a description of the Taiapure provisions and then Chapter 
Four introduces the analytical framework to be utilised, 
discussing why this particular framework was chosen and how 
it is applied. 
It should be mentioned here that the criteria of a study 
such as this, in a university setting with an academic goal, 
required the researcher to adopt an analytical framework. 
It is recognised that this framework, devised in a particular 
cultural context could be considered inappropriate for the 
unique New Zealand cultural context. The most appropriate 
assessment of these provisions would be that undertaken from 
a Maori perspective. However, the researcher as a Pakeha 
woman does not have the ability to do this and thus regards 
the framework chosen as the most appropriate tool under the 
circumstances. 
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Chapter Five then undertakes the assessment of the Taiapure 
provisions, fulfilling objective One and offering tentative 
conclusions for objective Two. 
Chapter Six, taking a case study approach, tests these tentativ 
conclusions by talking to iwi and hapu involved with the 
Taiapure provisions, and thus fulfills objective Two. 
Finally Chapter Seven, building on the previous chapters, 
fulfills Objective Three by offering conclusions and 
recommendations for the future. 
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CHAPTER TWO - CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers and discusses the context in which 
the Taiapure provisions are being implemented. It attempts 
to gain an understanding of the complex relations which make 
I 
up New Zealand's particular cultural context. Such a discussion 
must start with a consideration of the founding constitutional 
document of our nation, the Treaty of Waitangi. It then 
moves from the historical perspective to a current focus, 
considering the diversity in grouping and perception both 
between and within the Treaty partners. A brief summary 
statement ends the chapter. 
2.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
2.2.1 Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty was an agreement between the British Crown and 
te iwi Maori. The Treaty formalizes the right of government 
to make laws, but this is balanced with the right of iwi 
to organize as iwi and control their own resources. There 
are two versions of the TreatY2 with it being first written 
in English and then translated into Maori. The Treaty has 
a preamble followed by three articles which acknowledge 
respectively; Kawanatanga or governorship in the Maori version 
and Crown sovereignty in the English version (Article I), 
rangatiratanga or tribal control of Maori resources in the 
Maori version and full, exclusive possession of the resources 
in the English version (Article II) and the inclusion of 
Maori in citizen rights (Article III). Copies of the Treaty 
are found in Appendix One. 
There has been some debate about which version of the Treaty 
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is the 'right' version, with many writers taking one version 
as their primary point of reference. The Waitangi Tribunal 
adopts such a position in its interpretation of the Treaty, 
according the Maori text priority where there exists any 
ambiguity between the two texts. This study also regards 
the Maori text as taking primacy with the emphasis of the 
study being on the recognition of the Maori version of Article I 
II - rangatiratanga. 
There were difficulties with the translation of the two version~ 
of the Treaty. Ngata covers these problems with his 
understatement~ "The English expressions in the Treaty were 
not adequately rendered into Maori." (Ngata,1922:2) As Biggs 
(1989:303 in Kawharu,1989) points out, it is difficult to 
translate exactly what one language has said to another 
especially when the languages concerned are those of very 
dif£erent cultures. Not only this but the concepts embraced 
in the Treaty were often complicated legal terms such as 
sovereignty and pre-emption, which require lawyers whole 
books to define. The result of these difficulties in 
translation was two very different, in fact some say conflictin< 
versions of the treaty. 
Article I of the English version gave sovereignty to the 
Crown, sovereignty involving the right to exercise a 
jurisdiction at international level as well as within national 
boundaries. The word chosen by the missionaries to reflect 
sovereignty - kawanatanga - covered significant differences 
of meaning and was not likely to convey to Maori a precise 
definition of sovereignty. 
Far better to convey this meaning was the word chosen for 
Article II of the Maori version - rangatiratanga. 
Rangatiratanga was of Maori derivation and had connotations 
of chiefly power that were familiar to Maori. Kawanatanga 
on the other hand, derived from kawana (governor) had 
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asociations with the far off governors of New South Wales. 
It tended to imply authority in an abstract rather than a 
concrete sense. 
The words of Nopera Panakareo, a chief of the Rarawa combine 
the words of the first and second articles and convey the 
meaning Maori took from the provisions. 
"It is the shadow of the land which had been given to the 
Queen while the soil remains." 
From this, we see that Maori saw their' authority as being 
confirmed and entrenched by the Treaty and the authority 
of the Queen was something important but less than that held 
by themselves. 
In 1860, these perceptions were further ratified at the 
Kohimarama Conference held at Mission Bay in Auckland. Article 
II was expanded upon in the conference with the Maori version 
giving 'tino rangatiratanga' over their lands, villages and 
all things valued by them, '0 ratuou taonga katoa'. The 
English version guaranteed the 'full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of the Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries, 
and other properties they may ... possess'. It was understood 
that Maori were secure in their mana and rangatiratanga and 
the transfer of sovereignty was submerged beneath these rights. 
In other sections of the Treaty there were further translation 
and interpretation difficulties, yet it is the assertions 
in Article I and II being the 'essential bargain'3 of the 
Treaty that are of main interest to this study. 
The conflict between the two articles is ~isibly engaged 
in fisheries law, where early legislation virtually ignored 
the Treaty. What recognition was given amounted to little 
more than a symbolic gesture. For example, the 1877 Fish 
Protection Act 
" ... recognised the Treaty of Waitangi but the manner in 
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which it did illustrates a recurring theme ... that Maori 
concerns for the recognition of Treaty interests could 
be met by mentioning the Treaty in the Act, in a general 
way, and although everything else in the Act might be 
contrary to Treaty principles." (Muriwhenua Report,1988:85) 
In more recent years, the emphasis has moved to the rights 
conferred by Article II of the Treaty in an acknowledgment 
of the essential bargain struck between the Treaty partners. 
It seems evident that there was a divergence in perceptions, 
interpretations, expectations and understandings of the Treaty. 
The settlers believed that New Zealand was now British in 
name and authority, while te iwi Maori had no such perception. 
The ensuing years brought about struggles as the parties 
to the Treaty attempted to enforce their rights. European 
sovereignty was pursued with a vengeance while the rangatira 
o te iwi did their very best to maintain their existence 
let alone enforce their authority. The Treaty was pushed 
to one side for Pakeha New Zealanders in their rush to assert 
their authority. In more recent years there has been a 
rediscovery of the Treaty by Pakeha and a continuing and 
more articulate assertion of their Treaty rights by te iwi 
Maori. 
2.3 CURRENT CONTEXT 
When speaking of the Treaty it is obvious that there is a 
diversity of interest and many levels of understanding between 
and within the Treaty partners. This section explores these 
variables, with sub-sections 2.3.1 and 2.3~2 addressing who 
is involved and sub-section 2.3.3 discussing what these people 
think. Together the sections attempt to outline the 
'tirititanga' or the current state of knowledge about the 
Treaty. As Ritchie (1992:134) says, it is essential to have 
a reasonably detailed knowledge of the Treaty, "though not 
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of what you think the Treaty says but of what is currently 
the state of tirititanga." 
2.3.1 Resource User Groups 
When discussing the surrounding context of a natural resource 
issue, it is vital to identify the various resource user 
groups involved and their relations with each other. In 
the context surrounding the Maori Fisheries issue and more 
specifically the Taiapure issue, there are several resource 
user groups entangled. These groups are commonly (perhaps 
incorrectly) ident'ified as commercial, recreational, 
conservation, and Maori. 
The commercial interest group is a powerful sector involved 
in the fisheries resource. Access and use of the resource 
is monitored by the Quota Management System where certain 
amounts of quota are transferred to fishers who then have 
the responsibility of managing that quota and getting the 
best possible return on it. The Fishing Industry Board (FIB) 
is the national body which supports commercial fishing 
interests, dealing with promotion, marketing and acts as 
an effective data base. The Fishing Industry Association 
(FIA) and the Fishing Federation are agencies which also 
advance the commercial fishing interests. 
The recreational fishers are a disparate interest group who 
maintain that the fisheries resource is one for everyone. 
It is a common or public good that is universally accessible 
and usable. With the advent of the QMSand other fisheries 
policy modifications, the recreational interests have realised 
the need for an advocacy body representing their views. Thus 
their national body, the New Zealand Recreational Fishing 
Council has adjusted its structure and management process. 
Now, there are representative bodies at regional and national 
levels minding the recreational interests. 
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The conservation interests regard the fisheries resource 
as one to be looked after and maintained by ecological 
principles. Various bodies represent conservation interests 
but the one most directly involved with the fisheries resource 
would be the Department of Conservation which is an advocate 
of marine reservS~. 
The resource user group labeled 'Maori
' 
is as diverse, if 
not more than the recreational user group. The commercial 
interests of Maori fishers are represented by the Maori 
Fisheries Commission and Aotearoa Fisheries Limited. Other 
interests of this group do not have a easily recognisable 
national representative body. 
The Treaty was signed between the Crown and te iwi Maori, 
two parties with multifaceted parts. As was shown in the 
preceding discussion the Maori interest in the fisheries 
resource is represented, but only as one of many resource 
user groups, a posi~ion not indicative of their role as one 
of the Treaty partners. This representation is also lacking 
in its true reflection of the te iwi Maori. As Blackford 
and Matunga say, "Diversity of interest is more likely to 
be recognised in non-Maori rather than Maori concerns." 
(l99l:vii) Maori concerns regarding the fisheries resource 
or any resource in New Zealand can not be found by referring 
to one homogenous body, instead the massive inter and intra-iwi 
diversity must be addressed. 
The following section, which is particularly relevant to 
Objective Two of the study, considers this iwi diversity 
with a discussion of the tribal system. 
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2.3.2 Tribal System 
From the outset the Treaty set tribal agendas. 
"The treaty recognised rangatiratanga and that to Maori 
meant and means recognition of the authority, the 
sovereignty, of tribal systems personified in the 
authority of their chiefs." (Ritchie,1992:115-116) 
The Treaty was not signed by an homogenous entity called 
Maori but was signed with te iwi Maori. The concept of tribe 
and of tribal authority has been debilitated in the years 
since the signing of the Treaty, both by conscious policy 
actions and by the growing urbanization of Maori people. 
Maori people moving to towns and cities and bringing up other 
generations who ate born in these places can lose their sense 
of tribe. Policies which emphasize the entity 'Maori' rather 
than iwi add to this undermining of the tribal system. Because 
of such reasons, many people, Maori and Pakeha, think the 
concept of the tribe is redundant, however, there is presently 
a resurgence of the tribal system throughout the country. 
The use of the term tribe is for want of a better word. 
To be tribal can refer to any of the levels in tribal hierarchy 
Here, there is the whanau which is a basic social unit 
consisting of the extended family. Linked to the whanau 
is the hapu, consisting of a number of whanau all with a 
common ancestor. The term iwi is then adopted to include 
all the hapu descended from common ancestors. Ritchie describe 
an iwi as "an aggregation of interlinked family lineages 
or hapu." (1992:114) Waka, which literally means canoe 
signifies the largest grouping within. Maori society. Ritchie 
goes on to describe what it is to be tribal. 
"Being tribal is to own a history; to be located in a network 
of kinships, to inherit a mythology which includes a sense 
of place, a story of origin, possibly a waka; to acknowledge 
all this as your own culture, which in turn owns you." 
(1992:12l) 
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With the resurgence of tribal systems, the government realised 
the need to recognise tribal authorities. However, rather 
than being content to let tribes undertake their own 
identification process, the government proposed to set up 
its own procedures for recognising tribal authorities under 
its own criteria and processes. To look at tribal authorities 
in this way is essentially subsuming a fundamental Maori 
system into a governmental and thus Pakeha framework. "Maori 
rejected the idea, and in 1990 the Runanga Iwi Bill was dumped.' 
(Ritchie,1992:ll8) It is the right of iwi and hapu, as 
kinsfolk, to determine internally where their authority resides 
The Treaty debate places some emphasis on the importance 
of recognising the tribal system. For example, the principles 
of the Treaty that were developed by Maori interests imply 
several rights: the right of each iwi to speak for itself; 
the right of each iwi to determine its own preferences without 
recourse to anyone else, and; the right of each iwi to be 
diverse. They also imply the right of each iwi to be involved 
(at the very least) in resource management issues that affect 
their interests in a manner which acknowledges that the iwi's 
authority flows from the Treaty and/or its sovereignty as 
an iwi, rather than from the much lesser status of 'resource 
user group'.(Blackford and Matunga,1991:8) 
A question to be asked when discussing tribal systems, is 
how capable are the tribal authorities of controlling their 
resources? The strength of the tribal authorities lies in 
their management processes. 
"Their leadership cannot go far beyond the flax roots without 
being called to account. They operate on a set of principle 
of political action and accountability that is far more 
people responsive than are say, regional councils or even 
the elected membership of local bodies, because the open 
process of accountability on the marae is constant." 
(Ritchie.1992:127) 
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conversely, a weakness lies in their under-resourced state. 
Theoretically, tribes are wholly capable of controlling their 
resources and exercising their rangatiratanga, yet practically 
the skills and other resources necessary to do so, are lacking. 
Recognition of tribal authority without back-up in resources, 
in the form of management and information systems and financial 
capital, is likely to result in failure. 
The above discussion has shown the immense diversity in the 
groupings of the Treaty partners surrounding a policy such 
-
as the Taiapure provisions. There is diversity both within 
and between the Treaty partners, te iwi Maori and Pakeha 
New Zealanders. Maori are more than just another resource 
user group. 
2.3.3 Differing Perceptions 
The previous section has shown that the Treaty partners involved 
in a policy such as the Taiapure provisions are diverse. 
This section aims to look at the level of understanding held 
by these groups. 
"The Treaty has given rise to continual debate not only 
between Maori and Pakeha, Maori and Crown, but within 
the various parties themselves." (Blackford and 
Matunga,1991:8) 
Yet, "while levels of interest and tension with respect 
to Treaty issues are high, understanding of them so far 
remains low." (Kawharu,1989:xv) 
The Treaty has taken a place in the consciousness of all 
New Zealanders, both Maori and Pakeha. Awareness of the 
Treaty and its implications is high, yet an associated 
understanding of the issues surrounding the Treaty is not. 
As shown in the discussion of the Treaty in section 2.2.1, 
there was a gap between Maori and Pakeha viewpoints and 
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understandings on the Treaty and there is still a gap today. 
In the last two decades Maori confidence in their own future 
has become manifest in a new political assertiveness to 
challenge for a renegotiation of their rights in New Zealand. 
This assertiveness is based upon the rights guaranteed in 
the Treaty. 
Maori in general are well aware of the Treaty and what it 
says. They understand the articles and their implications 
and wish to translate them into actions benefiting their 
people today. The assertiveness is articulated on a tribal 
level, a level capable of effectively controlling and managing 
the tribal resources. Maori are moving with the changes 
taking place over the Treaty. Furthermore, they are pushing 
the changes and asserting their authority. 
In contrast, the majority of Pakeha in New Zealand have little 
understanding of the issues other than an awareness of the 
uncomfortable feelings produced by the Treaty debate. As 
Peter Elworthy, a Pakeha farmer, has noted; 
"there must be few issues, within the context of social 
change which have produced such tensions and negativism 
as the debate about the Treaty of Waitangi." (Planning 
Council,l988:13) 
The Treaty debate is disconcerting for many Pakeha as it 
confronts and challenges much of our history. It is unpalatabl 
to realise the extent of Maori oppression both past and present 
surely it is easier to pretend it did not and is not happening. 
Mitzi Nairn is an example of a Pakeha who is learning Of 
the oppression in our country and her words speak of the 
struggle going on for Pakeha facing their past and hence 
their future. 
"Our ignorance and confusion were genuine. Our collective 
ignorance as Pakeha was staggering. We expressed disbelief 
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in the face of new statistical information and case studies. 
We were amazed by the historical information we uncovered. 
We struggled and squirmed and rejected the definitions. 
Yet all the time we were learning, and the ideas and the 
movement were broadening. II (Yensen et aI, 1989:85) 
The issues being raised with the Treaty debate are difficult 
issues which bring forth feelings of hostility and bewilderment. 
The result of this is as stated by Ritchie (1992:193). 
liThe issues of race relations has produced a gap in which 
events are far ahead of public understanding." 
This reality is amply illustrated with events such as the 
Waitangi Tribunal's report on the Ngai Tahu claim and the 
Sealord fisheries deal receiving radically different receptions 
according to people's understanding and expectations. 
"That lack of understanding of the Treaty and its implications 
is the single largest impediment to a successful accord. 
Because most New Zealanders, if they have a sound basis 
of knowledge and thorough understanding, will deliver 
attitudes based on goodwill." (NZ Planning Council,1988) 
2.4 SUMMARY 
The Treaty of Waitangi sets the basis for our nation's cultural 
context. It was signed in a climate of misunderstanding, 
misperceptions and varying expectations. These variables 
have persisted until the present day, permeating all activities 
dealing with the nation's resources. Implementation of the 
Taiapure provisions must contend with the diversity of resource 
user groups, the diversity of the tribal system and the 
differing perceptions held for Treaty related issues in its 
bid to be successful. The next chapter describes the Taiapure 
provisions which are to be implemented in the context just 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER THREE - TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a description of the subject of the 
study, the Taiapure provisions. The boundaries of these 
provisions are set by detailing their objectives, written 
and perceived, their implementation process and the agencies 
involved in this process. A brief discussion of the current 
outcome of the provisions is then undertaken leading to a 
summarising comment. 
3.2 WHAT IS A TAIAPURE? 
When analysing the design of the Taiapure provisions the 
first question to ask is 'what are Taiapure?' Depending 
on the source used, the definition of a Taiapure varies. 
For example, a Taiapure is: 
"an estuarine or littoral coastal area which is traditionalll 
important to iwi or hapu." 
(Dept of Conservation and MAF Fisheries, August 1991) 
"a form of reserve designed to protect marine areas of 
traditional importance to Maori." (Webber,C 1992:18) 
"a legislative provision allowing Maori tribes to take 
control of coastal fishing grounds. 1I (HB Herald Tribune, 
F " 
1991) , 
"Taiapure" is derived from "tai" coastal and "apure" (a patch 
or circumscribed area). In the context of the Fisheries 
Act, Taiapure means a local fishery area in estuarine or 
littoral waters. There is, unfortunately no one precise 
definition of estuarine or littoral coastal waters, thus 
the terms are open to debate as to what they actually mean. 
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No legal document states that the Taiapure area should be 
limited in size but its smallness is implied with supporting 
documents, such as letters by the Minister of Fisheries and 
appears to be a commonly held view by other groups with an 
interest in the fisheries resource. 
Yet, it is not the view of many of the people involved in 
putting forward Taiapure proposals. For example, the Manakau 
Harbour proposal covers a large area of water, estuarine 
water though it is, and has the potential of limiting commerci 
fishing in the area. Tainui, the iwi behind the proposal, 
have plans for the harbour, such as transplanting kai onto 
sandbanks around the harbour to correct the imbalance of 
the ecosystem, that will require the entire harbour area 
to implement. (MFC Newsletter, March 1991:5) 
3.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
Not only is there ambiguity regarding the size of Taiapure, 
but there are also various interpretations as to the intentior 
of the provisions. The written objective of the provisions 
as stated in section 54a of the Act is "to make, in relation 
to fisheries waters that have customarily been of special 
significance to any iwi or hapu, better provision for the 
recognition of rangatiratanga and qf the right secured in 
relation to fisheries by Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
However, the intention of Taiapure, according to a covering 
letter of the booklet "Taiapure Guidelines for Applicants" 
put out by MAF Fisheries, is "to give .. local communities a 
greater say in how the fisheries in each taiapure area are 
used." (MAF Fisheries, Oct 1991) 
Conversations with applicants involved in the Taiapure proces: 
and readings of supporting documents such as the MAF Fisherie: 
booklet and letters to and from the Minister of Fisheries, 
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suggest the objectives linked to the Taiapure provisions 
are manifold. There is the written objective, clearly stated 
in the legislation (found in Appendix Two) and then there 
are the perceived objectives. Further discussion of these 
differing objectives is undertaken later in the study, in 
section 5.2.1. 
Essentially, the Taiapure provisions are offering local 
communities, who must have the support of the local hapu 
or iwi, the opportunity to set up advisory committees which 
will then have a degree of say in the control and management 
of the fisheries resource in the determined area. The committeE 
can recommend regulations to the Minister of Fisheries to 
manage the area. These regulations can override any other 
fisheries regulations, providing the Minister agrees and 
the regulations go not refuse access to or use of a Taiapure 
to any person 'by reason of colour, race or ethnic origins'. 
3.4 IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
There are three stages in the process of applying for a 
Taiapure. (a flow diagram detailing the process is found 
in Appendix Three) It is a lengthy somewhat complex process 
with many facets remaining in the unknown box, in terms of 
time. 
Stage One of the process is probably the most time consuming 
phase, as it consists of the applicants getting the views 
of all interest groups and individuals, deciding whether 
a proposal is worthwhile, then actually putting the proposal 
to paper and presenting it to the Minister of Fisheries. 
The end of this stage is reached when the Minister, having 
consulted with the Minister of Maori Affairs, (at present, 
these two portfolios are both held by Doug Kidd) makes a 
decision on the proposal in principle. If it is rejected, 
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it is referred back to the applicants. If it is supported, 
it moves onto stage two of the process. MAF Fisheries are 
available to provide information to the applicants at this 
stage and they must also report to the Minister on the proposal. 
The second stage is reached when notice of the proposal is 
published in the Gazette, advertised nationally and copies 
of it are given to the district Maori Land Court, the relevant 
territorial authority and regional council. This distribution 
should take seven days. In the following two months the 
notice is published in the Gazette a second time and submissions 
and objections are called for by the Maori Land Court Registrar. 
If the court accepts the proposal at that stage, it sets 
up a Taiapure Tribunal headed by one of the court's judges. 
The Tribunal holds a public inquiry (no time limit specified) 
and reports back to the Minister, who then makes a decision. 
The Gazette is used once again, this time to publish the 
tribunal report, its recommendations and the Fisheries 
Minister's decision. At this point, objectors to the proposal 
have a month to appeal to the High Court, otherwise the proposal 
moves onto stage three. 
Here, the Minister of Fisheries recommends the Governor-General 
declare a Taiapure by order-in-council, the Taiapure declaration 
is gazetted and the Minister appoints a Taiapure management 
committee. The Minister has the final decision as to who 
sits on the Taiapure committee, but s/he will be aided by 
people representative of the local Maori community. The 
management committee will recommend the regulations they 
wish to enforce in the Taiapure area, and these will be gazetted 
once the Minister has given the final approval. The application 
has now reached the end of the process and is a fully fledged, 
operational Taiapure. 
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3.5 AGENCIES CONNECTED TO THE TAIAPURE PROCESS 
Throughout the process, the applicants will have contact 
with several agencies. MAF Fisheries is the lead agency, 
providing applicants with advice on their proposal development, 
reports and submissions, assistance with meetings with affected 
groups if required and have the responsibility of reporting 
to the Minister on the proposal in the first stage. Other 
central and local government agencies have art interest in 
the Taiapure process. 
The Department of Conservation, in line with its coastal 
responsibilities and interests, can provide the applicants 
with information from its coastal inventory and can be present 
at any meetings called by the applicants to resolve issues 
concerning marine reserves and freshwater species. The Maori 
Land Court have the responsibility of conducting a public 
inquiry into all objections and submissions. Manatu Maori 4 
advises the Minister of Maori Affairs on Taiapure proposals 
and may make submissions to the Taiapure Tribunal hearing. 
The Maori Fisheries Commission does not have any mandate 
to be involved in the Taiapure process, but they do have 
a natural interest and have been active in submissions to 
the Fisheries Task Force regarding the Taiapure provisions. 
They regard the issues in the Taiapure provisions as relating 
to traditional Maori fisheries systems and see them as being 
of great importance to iwi. Their official newsletter, "Te 
Reo 0 Te Tini A Tangaroa" often carries articles concerning 
Taiapure and the Commission makes an effort to ckeep iwi and 
hapu informed of any developments. 
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3.6 CURRENT OUTCOME 
At present, September 1992, only two proposals have been 
approved in principle by the Minister. No applications have 
reached the final stage whereby a management committee is 
appointed. Despite this slow progress, many more proposals 
are being formulated by hapu and iwi allover the country. 
MAF Fisheries has some idea of these numbers as the applicants 
approach MAF Fisheries for advice. The numbers that no-one 
has access to, however, is those groups that have started 
on the process then gave up in frustration or because of 
lack of resources. As well as the process being costly in 
terms of time, it absorbs a sizeable quantity of money 
resources. It is probable that some iwi or hapu have found 
these costs prohibitive to their involvement in the process. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has given an idea as to the complexity of the 
Taiapure provisions. It has illustrated the manifold objective 
or purposes linked with the provisions and has described 
the intricate and intervention laden process through which 
applicants must journey to set up a Taiapure. It is these 
points and others that will be assessed with the application 
of an analytical framework in Chapter Five in the hope of 
fulfilling objective One of the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to fulfill objective One of the study, that is, 
to find out if the Taiapure provisions are designed to work, 
an analytical framework is applied. This chapter discusses 
how the framework was chosen, describes its main features 
and details its elements. 
4.2 CHOOSING THE ANALYTICAL TOOL 
"Implementation is the carrying Dut of a basic policy decision 
usually made in a statute. Ideally, that decision identifies 
the problems to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) 
to be pursued, and, in a variety of ways, "structures" 
the implementation process." 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980:540) 
The researcher turned to the policy literature concerning 
implementation in the hope that an analytical framework capable 
of assessing the Taiapure provisions, would be found. Upon 
reading a portion of the literature the researcher noted 
two primary variables that were consistently discussed regardins 
the implementation process. The first was the statute itself 
and the second variable of concern was the context in which 
the statute is implemented. Most pOlicy scholars emphasize 
the importance of context for as Berman (1980:206) argues; 
"a context-free theory of implementation is unlikely to produce 
powerful explanations or accurate predictions." 
These two variables are found to be highly relevant for the 
Taiapure provisions which has, as the two previous chapters 
illustrated, a complex context and an elaborate statutory 
process. Several theoretical frameworks were then assessed 
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for their explanatory power for the Taiapure provisions. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) are primarily interested in 
the statute, where they place an emphasis upon the clarity 
of goals, procedures and jurisdictions and the degree of 
support from key legislators, implementing officials and 
sympathetic constituencies (Montgomery,1990:34). O'Toole 
(1986) and Mueller (1984) are concerned with the context 
surrounding a statute, with O'Toole focusing on implementation 
in multi-actor settings and Mueller focusing on implementation 
at the local level with national policies. Katzmann (1989) 
is interested in both variables, statute and context, yet 
his paper particulary discusses "legislative drafting and 
then examines the legislative process itself as a means for 
directing signals to various institutional forces." 
(Katzmann,R,1989:288) 
None of these frameworks were judged capable of assessing 
the unique Taiapure provisions as they were either too concerne 
with one variable to the neglect of the other or were too 
concerned with a particular type of context and statute. 
What was needed was a framework that was equally concerned 
with the statute and its context and was general enough to 
apply to an incomparable statute such as the Taiapure 
provisions. 
4.3 DESIGN APPROACH 
These characteristics were found in Ingram and Schneider's 
(1988,1990) model which takes a design approach. This is 
an integrative strategy which is sensitive to the reality 
of multiple values in a policy situation. Policy design 
has an inherent view of both the formulation and implementatioJ 
phases of policy development. 
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"Policy design, whether conceptualized as a verb referring 
to the process of formulating policy ideas or as a noun 
describing the logic through which policy intends to achieve 
its objectives ••. is obviously important." 
(Ingram and Schneider,l988:6l-62) 
The design approach allows a systematic analysis of the 
underlying structural logic contained in the provisions, 
thus making the assumptions upon which the provisions rest 
more explicit. 
An important factor in this approach 1S the link between 
policy and context. Ingram and Schneider do not believe 
that there is one single model for an effective statute, 
rather smart statutes are designed for the context in which 
they are to be implemented. This belief is particularly 
important for the analysis of the Taiapure provisions. Here, 
the presence of the Treaty of Waitangi brings a particular 
context to the statute, with the factors and characteristics 
unique to this specific implementation context having a ~trong 
effect on outcomes. A design approach allows a scrutiny 
of these factors. 
A further important factor in this analytical framework is 
the amount of discretion allocated to implementing agents 
in the statute. Ingram and Schneider address this through 
a 'value-added' conception of implementation in which the 
extent of discretion exercised by implementers is measured 
by changes they make in the core elements of policy. These 
core elements of policy are found in the basic statutory 
blue print or design. 
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4.4 ELEMENTS AND LINKAGES OF POLICY DESIGN 
The basic elements of the policy designs include objectives 
or purposes, agents and targets. These are then linked togeth( 
in the design by tools, rules and assumptions. By breaking 
down the empirical example into its basic constituent parts, 
patterns in which the elements have been arranged can be 
analyzed. To clarify, the elements of policy are listed 
as follows. 
Structural elements: 
- objectives or purpose (0) 
- target populations (T) 
- agents and agencies (A) 
Linkages among elements: 
- tools (t) 
- rules (r) 
- assumptions or theories (a) 
The underlying logic or pattern in which the elements are 
arranged, can be drawn and shown graphically. 
S t,r,a a 
Figure 4.1 
.. 
This diagram shows a statute (S), three implementing agencies, 
two target populations and two objectives. These elements 
are linked together by the tools, rules and assumptions. 
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4.4.1 Objectives 
The objectives, purposes or goals of the policy may be 
explicitly stated in written documents or they may be inferred 
from interviews and discussion with interested parties. 
The objectives are not always immediate, short term, measurable, 
achievable, clear or consistent. In fact, policies often 
pursue goals or objectives that are inconsistent and require 
balancing conflicting interests or values. An attempt should 
be made when analyzing policies to include the objectives 
of all relevant groups not simply those legislatively mandated 
4.4.2 Target Populations 
The target populations in the design are the groups or 
individuals whose decisions and behavior are related to pOlicy 
objectives directly or indirectly. These are the people 
who are expected to gain and lose from the policy. The 
provisions of the policy may designate eligibility rules 
that define the target population. Ingram and Schneider 
also note that the policy criteria may reflect principles 
of equality, need, equity, effort expended, potential 
contribution to solving the problems, or some combination 
of these. Further to this, Ingram and Schneider note that 
policy may permit targets to be self-selected or may provide 
for voluntary participation. 
4(. 4.3 Agents 
The agents in the design are the officials assigned 
responsibilities by policy documents as well as others who 
may have assumed responsibilities in relation to the policy . 
.. 
Dimensions of interest with the agent element include the 
locus of control, that is the level of government responsible 
for key design decisions and the level of control, that is 
the value-added dimension, or amount of discretion permitted. 
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4.4.4 Tools, Rules and Assumptions 
The linkage mechanisms for the three elements discussed above 
are tools, rules and assumptions. Tools are intended to 
motivate the agents, agencies and target populations to make 
decisions and take actions consistent with policy objectives. 
Ingram and Schneider regard tools as relying upon authority, 
capacity building, incentives, appeals to symbols, and learning 
to motivate agencies and target groups. Rules in a policy 
design determine procedures such as timing, evaluation 
requirements and conditions for participation. 
The theories or assumptions then explain why the tools and 
rules are expected to produce the intended behaviour and 
how the behaviour is linked to desired objectives. 
4.5 CONTEXTUAL ASSESSMENT 
With Ingram and Schneider's model, a vital step in analyzing 
a policy example is to match the design to the context. 
The context of the statute, as determined with the design 
focus, should signal which values are lacking in the context 
in which the statute is being framed. Having identified 
the problems, the analyst should then clarify the values 
needed for successful implementation. And it is here, that 
the value-added concept comes into play, with the optimum 
level of discretion for agents offering a way towards successfu' 
implemeritation. 
Ingram and Schneider offer three contextual characteristics 
that may be targeted for improved implementation. The amount 
of discretion needed for each characteristic can then be 
discussed in an attempt to improve the design of the statute. 
The first characteristic is related to support for the policy, 
with a successful policy requiring extensive support. Knowledgf 
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and certainty about the policy content is the second 
characteristic with the quality of the policy largely resting 
on the quality of information. The third characteristic 
is the amount of motivation and capacity for the implementation 
of the policy. Agents and agencies may have the necessary 
information to implement the policy and they may support 
it, but if they lack the motivation and capacity to move 
through the process, implementation will be unsuccessful. 
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Ingram and Schneider's model 
is not advanced as the ideal framework for assessing the 
Taiapure provisions, but it is advanced as a vehicle capable 
of analysing the provisions. It offers the means for examining 
the underlying structural logic of the provisions and allows 
an assessment of the linkages between the design and its 
context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE - ANALYSIS OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter undertakes an analysis of the Taiapure provisions 
using the analytical framework outlined in the previous chapter 
and drawing upon issues raised in Chapter Two. The analysis 
takes place in thre~ steps. The first step in assessing 
whether the Taiapure provisions are 'smart' or not, is to 
consider the context in which Taiapure are implemented. 
An appraisal of the context in terms of the three 
characteristics outlined in section 4.5, creates a basis 
for assessing whether the Taiapure provisions are designed 
to accommodate these characteristics. The second step, then 
examines the underlying structural logic of the Taiapure 
provisions. This is 'undertaken in terms of the elements 
and linkages sketched in section 4.4. The third step brings 
the first two sections together in concluding whether the 
provisions are a 'smart' statute. 
5.2 CONTEXT OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
"Statutes need to be designed in such a way as to bias 
the implementation process toward supplying the values 
crucial to successful implementation, defined in terms 
of the production of desired consequences, increased 
knowledge and increased political support." 
(Ingram and Schneider,1990:82) 
The following 1S going to assess the context of the Taiapure 
provisions in terms of the three characteristics outlined 
in section 4.5. This assessment creates a ba&is for examining 
and later assessing the design of the provisions. 
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5.2.1 Support for the Taiapure Provisions 
For policy to make progress on any problem there has to be 
sufficient support. This characteristic is concerned with 
whether there is agreement on the values and goals of the 
provisions or whether there is conflict. Asdemonstrated 
in Chapter Two, there are various resource user groups involved 
in the Taiapure provisions. These groups all have varying 
levels of support for the policy, ranging from whole hearted 
approval to outright dislike, fear and condemnation. 
The Maori group, in line with its inherent diversity has 
a wide range of perceptions as to the intent and purpose 
of the Taiapure provisions. These may be broadly grouped 
into four main intentions: to recognize rangatiratanga; to 
provide local control: to prevent overfishing, and; to enhance 
the fisheries resource. The fisheries resource is regarded 
as a taonga that must be looked after and enhanced. It is 
not 'owned' in the European sense, rather the resource owns 
the people who live with it. It is the responsibility of 
the local people to protect and maintain the fisheries resource 
and they must have the authority to do this. The second 
article of the Treaty merely reaffirms this right and 
responsibility in a legislative manner. It did not create 
the right. Rather it gave recognition to an already existing 
practice, a practice that was not limited by legislative 
boundaries but ran on rohe boundaries determined by rangatira 
authority and co-operation with other iwi and hapu. 
The recreational fishing group too, is diverse and the followinS 
views can not be said to be fully representative of all 
recreational fishers. yet, it appears to bea commonly held 
perception of recreational fishers, as set out in s~bmissions 
and press releases from the the New Zealand Recreational 
Fishing Council and the New Zealand Underwater group, that 
"access to the fishery is the right of every New Zealander 
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and that there is total opposition to access to and/or 
management of the fishery resource on racial grounds." 
(NZ Underwater,1992:2) 
In line with this view, Taiapure, if they are provided for 
at all, should only do so in very small areas. Recreational 
fishers regard the requirement, 'that it be traditional fishing 
grounds' as a limiting and restrictive boundary. Their 
perception of rangatiratanga and traditional authority thus 
appears somewhat different from the iwi and hapu involved. 
Commercial fishing interests have a similar perception of 
the, extent of the traditional Maori fishing right, being 
prepared to 
"accept the principle of Taiapure" as long as they are 
"small discrete areas within an estuary or on a coastline .•. " 
(The Press,29 June 1992) 
The Maori belief that the taiapure provisions give them the 
right to apply for very large areas of fisheries waters is 
"way off target", according to commercial interests. The 
commercial fishers have got a staunch hold over the fisheries 
resource and they are not prepared to let traditional fishing 
interests intrude upon this domain. 
Conservation interests as represented by the Department of 
Conservation appear unsure as to the intentions of the Taiapure 
provisions and attempt to cover all alternatives. A pamphlet 
put out by DoC and MAF Fisheries, simultaneously portrays 
Taiapure as recognising rangatiratanga, local communities, 
local Maori communities and allowing restoration of coastal 
fisheries. 
Not only do the resource user groups in terms of commercial, 
recreational and conservation, have differing revels of support 
but the agencies responsible for implementation of the policy, 
too, regard the Taiapure provisions in many different ways. 
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This discussion illustrates the level of support held for 
the Taiapure provisions. Rather than there being widely 
held support for the policy, there exists extensive value 
conflict and disagreement over the goals and objectives of 
the Taiapure provisions. 
5.2.2 Knowledge and Certainty about Taiapure Provisions 
The second contextual characteristic identified by the 
analytical framework is concerned with the level of knowledge 
and certainty about the policy content. As demonstrated 
in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, there is neither a high 
level of knowledge or certainty surrounding the Taiapure 
provisions. The lack of knowledge manifests itself in the 
reactions to the policy. Debate over the size of the Taiapure , 
access to the proposed areas, linkages with other policy 
regulating fisheries and the meaning and extent of 
rangatiratanga, all testify to a general lack of knowledge. 
Linked to the lack of knowledge is a pervasive uncertainty 
surrounding the policy. This uncertainty is shared by all 
parties, from the applicants to the policy opposition to 
the implementing agencies such as MAF Fisheries. The meaning 
of littoral or estuarine waters is an illustration of this, 
where no-one can agree as to the exact meaning of the terms. 
Understandings of the term littoral range from 'inhabiting 
the shore of a sea or the shallow waters near the shore' 
(Collins Dictionary,l979) to 'areas of the sea where light 
penetrates.' (Terry Lynch, pers comm) The commercial fishers 
concerned with this uncertainty have taken the issue to court, 
moving to obtain a declaratory judgment from the High Court 
as to the meaning of Taiapure. 
Another example of the lack of knowledge and certainty is 
found with the use of rangatiratanga and Maori fishing rights. 
This shall be further explored later in section 5.4, but 
- 36 -
it is suffice to say that the knowledge and understanding 
about Maori fishing rights as reflected in the provisions, 
is of a low level. The provisions are full of ambiguities 
which do not add to certainty but detract from it. Examples 
are the many instances of "time unknown" in the process and 
the myriad objectives of the policy. 
Overall, the context of the provisions demonstrates a high 
degree of misinformation, uncertainty and a lack of knowledge. 
This is largely a result of the complexity of the problem. 
As displayed in Chapter Two, with the discussion of the 
historical and current context, the problem is complex, it 
spans many years and involves a diversity of people with 
an amalgam of values. Resolution of the problem requires 
a clarification of the many issues that make up the context. 
The information on which the Taiapure provisions rest needs 
to be sound. 
5.2.3 Motivation and Capacity for Taiapure Provisions 
The final contextual characteristic to be considered in terms 
of the Taiapure provisions, is the amount of motivation and 
capacity for the policy. This characteristic considers whether 
target populations and agencies linked to the provisions 
will do, and whether they can do, what the statute asks or 
requires them to do. 
In terms of motivation, this appears to be largely lacking 
in the implementing agencies. MAF Fisheries and the other 
agencies do not appear driven to actively pursue the Taiapure 
provisions. In contrast, several iwi and hapu are driven 
to pursue the provisions, for should the written objective 
be realised, the success will affect them positively. Yet 
these agents rarely have the capacity to substantiate their 
motivation. Resources, in time, money and expertise are 
not amply accessible to Taiapure applicants and thus the 
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lack of these resource acts as an obstacle to the successful 
implementation of the policy. 
Capacity to implement the policy also affects the implementing 
agencies. It is estimated by MAF Fisheries that the 
administering and enforcing of the Taiapure provisions will 
cost the government more than one million dollars a year. 
And the cost may go higher when the Maori Land Court, which 
also has a big role to play in the Taiapure application hearing 
process, works out its likely costs. (MFC Newsletter,Jan 
1992:6) 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
This section, 5.2, has demonstrated the aspects in which 
the context of the Taiapure provisions 'fall short' of the 
three characteristics. There exists a situation of broad 
value and goal conflict leading to varied and often little 
suppor~ for the provisions. There exists a situation of 
uncertainty, misunderstanding and a general lack of knowledge 
for all parties involved with the provisions. This lack 
of knowledge permeates all levels of the context from the 
central 'big' concepts such as rangatiratanga, to the more 
discrete but equally pressing concepts such as littoral and 
estuarine waters. Finally, there exists a variance between 
the motivation of the target populations and their capacity 
to substantiate their motivation. The motivation of the other 
agencies is too, highlighted as being insufficient for effective 
implementation. 
Having assessed the context and pinpointed areas where "values 
need to be added", the design of the provisions shall be 
now be examined. An assessment of their match to the context 
is then undertaken in section 5.4. 
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5.3 UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL LOGIC 
As outlined in Chapter Four, the structural elements of policy 
design include objectives, agents, targets, and linkages 
among these three elements. It is possible to diagram the 
structural logic of a policy by showing the relationships 
among these elements. (see Fig.4.1) The Taiapure provisions 
(S) are linked to several implementing agencies (AI ,A2 ,A3 
etc) MAF, Maori Land Court, DoC and Manatu Maori as detailed 
in Chapter Three. The provisions interact directly with 
the target population of iwi and hapu (TI ) in an effort to 
address the non-recognition of rangatiratanga and the fisheries 
right secured by Article II of the Treaty. Other populations 
affected by the policy are those with an interest in the 
fisheries resource. As much of New Zealand is connected 
to the coast and its bounty, this target population (T 2 )will 
be referred to as the general community. The objectives 
or purpose of the policy are singularly clear in the written 
legislation, but are perceived in varying ways. The T2 group 
are noted to have differing perceptions of the objectives 
than those of the TI group, a situation that will be discussed 
below. The linkage~ between these elements may contain tools, 
rules and assumptions. 
5.3.1 Objectives 
Ingram and Schneider note that policies, although they may 
have clearly stated objectives in their legislation, often 
pursue objectives that are inconsistent and require balancing 
of conflicting interests or values. The Taiaptire provisions 
are a prime example of such a policy, with the written objective 
being clearly aimed at Maori people and their traditional 
~ 
fishing right, yet with supporting documents attempting to 
include all people with an interest in the fisheries resource. 
The written objective, "to make ... better provision for the 
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recognition of rangatiratanga and of the right secured in 
relation to fisheries by Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi", 
could be labeled as a goal that is "serving hortatory purposes, 
the statements of which are an end in themselves." (Ingram 
and Schneider,1988:70) That is, the objective shows the 
government's intent to make provision for enhanced Maori 
involvement in the control and management of the fisheries 
resource. By making this intent explicit in legislation, 
the problem of non-recognition of rangatiratanga is partly 
adddressed without any tangible action being taken. It is 
an aspiration that provides a·sense of direction and testifies 
to the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi in fisheries 
issues. Maori, as a target population are presumably expected 
to take heatt at such· an objecti~e and regard it as addressing 
their concerns. 
As noted in section 3.3, the written, explicitly stated 
objective is not the only one linked with the Taiapure 
provisions. All the various groups with an interest in the 
fisheries resource have certain ideas as to the meaning and 
purpose of the provisions. Ingram and Schneider believe 
that an analyst should be inclusive when discussing objectives 
and should "seek to represent the values of all relevant 
groups, not simply the legislatively mandated goals." (Ingram 
and Schneider,1988:70) 
To this end it is important to identify the perceptions of 
those resource user groups recognized in Chapter Two, an 
exercise that was undertaken in the previous section, 
illustrating the broad value and goal conflicts that exist 
in the context of the Taiapure provisions. From this brief 
look at the values and perceptions of the various resource 
user groups, it is obvious that the objectives, written and 
perceived, of the Taiapure provisions are manifold and 
potentially conflicting. The provisions attempt to balance 
all the interests and end up pleasing none of them. 
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5.3.2 Target Populations 
In line with the inconsistent and conflicting perceptions 
of the Taiapure objectives, the target populations of the 
policy are also ill perceived. Essentially, the Taiapure 
provisions are targeting iwi and hapu, however this may be 
perceived as a racial criteria, thus section 54K,6 states 
I no person can be refused access to or use of any taiapure 
by race, colour etc ' , ensures equality. The designation 
of iwi and hapu as the target population is then subsumed 
within the desire for equal access for all New Zealanders. 
The Taiapure provisions do not appear to take a proactive 
stance towards the target population of iwi and hapu, rather 
they exist as a reactive framework should any iwi or hapu 
wish to utilise the provisions. The iwi or hapu then have 
to prove their eligibility to take part in the Taiapure 
framework before beginning the process. Not only do they 
have to prove their eligibility but they have to demonstrate 
to the Minister's satisfaction that no-one's welfare in the 
'vicinity of the area is detrimentally impacted I • This burden 
of proof necessarily places a great financial and human resource 
drain on the Taiapure applicants. The social costs too, 
are of significant proportion. Should a Taiapure proposal 
be put to a community that is not responsive to the idea, 
the applicants are then in a position of having created (or 
just taken the lid off) community tension and disturbance. 
It can then be difficult for the applicants living in this 
community. 
5.3.3 Agents and Agencies 
As noted in the previous chapter the agents are those people 
assigned responsibilities by the policy documents as well 
as others who may have assumed responsibilities in relation 
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to the policy. The Taiapure applicants transform from target 
populations to agents of the policy. Yet, in this 
transformation there is little or no transfer of control. 
Control is not transferred to the applicants until the final 
stage of the process when a ma~agement committee is set up, 
and even this level of control is questionable. 
The control is firmly in the hands of the assigned implementing 
agencies, such as outlined in section 3.5, and the Minister 
of Fisheries. In the present political climate, the Minister 
of Fisheries and Minister of Maori Affairs are the one and 
the same, thus this person has the potential to have an 
inordinate level of control over an essentially local process. 
The Minister has a pervasive influence throughout the process 
of establishment, the appointment of the management committee 
and the approval of regulations. 
Among the agencies with control, MAF Fisheries has a greater 
level than the others. The overt presence of an agency wholly 
concerned with the fisheries resource and the Minister of 
Fisheries puts emphasis on one of the perceived intentions 
of the policy. That is, the objective of restoring and 
enhancing the fisheries resource. Certainly, the Maori fishing 
rights under the treaty are of concern to MAF Fisheries, 
yet it should be questioned as to whether they are a driving 
force or an incidental one. Such issues will without doubt 
affect the way in which the agency goes about implementing 
the Taiapure provisions. 
Agencies whose prime concern is the recognition and restoration 
of rangatiratanga, such as the Maori Fisheries Commission, 
do not have a legislative mandate over the Taiapure provisions. 
The absence of such an agency, again must point to a genuine 
lack of interest in seeing the Taiapure objective realised. 
The Taiapure applicants literally have no-one to turn to 
in their bid to create a Taiapure; as agencies willing to 
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help do not have the allocated resources to do so, and those 
who have been allocated to help do not appear to be motivated 
to do so. Thus, the level of support for the Taiapure 
provisions is not seen to go hand in hand with the level 
of control. 
5.3.4 Linkages: Tools, Rules and Assumptions 
The linkage mechanisms for the three elements discussed above 
are tools, rules and assumptions. The tools in the Taiapure 
provisions, intended to motivate the agents and target 
populations, are little more than the somewhat hortatory 
written objective of the policy. This objective is emotive 
in that it preys upon the responsibility of honouring the 
Treaty obligations and contains the promise of fulfilling 
these obligations - such as the recognition of rangatiratanga. 
In this manner, implementing agencies feel a responsibility 
towards the policy and the target populations feel a motivation 
to exploit the policy for whatever it is worth. 
Rules, on the other hand, are abundant in the Taiapure 
provisions. As detailed in Chapter Three the process necessary 
to create a Taiapure is a lengthy and complex procedure. 
The Maori Fisheries Commission regard the provisions as having 
"excessively bureaucratic and intervention laden procedures 
for the establishment of taiapure." (MFC, 1992:3) The burden 
of proof rule, where iwi or hapu must prove their relationship 
and thus right of access and use to the resource, is a 
particular example of the excessive rules present in the 
provisions. As a condition for participation, this rule 
may result in acting as an obstacle to participation rather 
than an encouragement. 
The rigid rules detailed down to the last inch can lead to 
the characterization of the provisions as a 'strong statute'. 
"Strong statute advocates advise that discretion over the 
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elements (ie. rules) in designs should be retained by 
statutory designers. Implementers should have no discretion 
to add values, and instead are supposed to reproduce 
faithfully statutory designs." (Ingram and Schneider,1990:74) 
H9wever, a Istrong statute I is also characterised by clear 
and specific goals, no room for diverging interpretations, 
a minimum of decision points, and a minimum level of discretion 
given to implementers. The Taiapure provisions clearly do 
not fulfull all these criteria, thus the presence of rigid 
rules and procedures do not automatically make the design 
a Istrong statute ' • Instead, the presence of vague goals 
suggest more of a I·support building ' approach where it is 
left open to the actors involved to further define what the 
goals should be. 
Further conditions of participation detailed by the rules 
involve the applicants being limited to providing a proposal 
and then being ready to Imanl a management committee should 
it get to this stage. They cannot unduly influence the process 
once their proposal has entered the 'rules race ' . 
Assumptions underlying the Taiapure provisions, explaining 
why the tools and rules are the way they are, have been implied 
throughout the preceding discussion. The presence of a highly 
motivating objective partnered by a highly dissuading structure 
of rules and procedures, suggests a symbolic policy design. 
"Symbolic and hortatory designs encourage compliance or 
utilization of policy through manipulation of symbols ... 
no actual or tangible goods are offered. Rather, policy 
urges·or encourages certain actions by attempting to alter 
perceptions, attitudes, or values." 
(Ingram and Schneider;1988:76) 
The Taiapure provision's attempt at altering perceptions 
appe~rs rather half-hearted on the basis of the manifold 
perceptions still existing three years after the policy was 
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enacted. Yet, the provisions do appear to be a symbolic 
gesture, full of potential but lacking in the practical 
applicability to the reality situation. This applicability 
shall be further explored in the following section. The 
risks and shortcomings of symbolic and hortatory policy have 
been studied by policy analysts. Although feelings about 
policy may be positive, accomplishments may not materialize. 
"Symbolic and hortatory policies that fail to achieve 
objectives may result in cynicism and alienation among 
agents and targets." (Ingram and Schneider,l988:77) 
Whether this is the case with the Taiapure applicants shall 
be explored in Chapter Six. It has been seen to be the case 
with some officials of implementing agencies who regard the 
Taiapure provisions as a "toothless tiger." 
5.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE TAIAPURE PROVISIONS 
Having assessed the context Ln which the Taiapure provisions 
are implemented, and then examined the design of the provisions, 
exposing the underlying structural logic, the study now turns 
to the linkages between the context and the design, determining 
whether the Taiapure provisions are a 'smart statute' or 
not. The assessment, in tune with the context assessment 
in section 5.2, will take place in terms of the three 
characteristics, which is then followed by a conclusion. 
5.4.1 Role of Support in the Taiapure Provisions 
Section 5.2 demonstrated the lack of support for the provisions, 
wrought by the broad value conflict existing in the policy 
context. A question to be asked when assessing the linkages 
between the provisions and the context is "how is the existence 
of conflicting values and goals accounted for in this statute?" 
The presence of vague goals which allow room for diverging 
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interpretations, in a 'support building' policy approach 
are an attempt to address the conflicting values. It allows 
the actors, particularly on a local level, to work out what 
they want out of a Taiapure, whether it is to be big or small 
and how it is to be managed. 
Ingram and Schneider would suggest an allocation of discretion 
to lower level implementers in such a context. That is, 
let the applicants in the differing areas have more room 
to maneuver, with the rules being applicable to their particular 
situation. More discretion being allocated to local level 
implementation is likely to lead to locally appropriate policy 
with mechanisms and forums being provided to represent interests 
whose consent is important to successful implementation. 
In this way applicants can be involved at all stages of the 
Taiapure process instead of putting together a proposal, 
sending it to the Minister and waiting an undefined time 
for a reply. Locally appropriate policy is likely to then 
receive greater support, leading to successful implementation. 
It is not being suggested that the rules of the Taiapure 
provisions are entirely eliminated, for a process of some 
sort is a necessary and accepted mechanism which ensures 
public input ~nd a degree of uniformity (John Mitchell, pers 
comm). Rather it is deemed important that there be numerous 
entry points for the applicants to add local value. 
The Taiapure provisions allow discretion for local variety 
by not specifying the goals and thus do not enforce an 
inappropriate framework. In this respect, then, it can be 
argued that the provisions are 'smart'. However, in other 
respects, it can be argued that the tools, rules and assumptions 
of the Taiapure provisions are not matching the the need 
to 'build support' (agreement on goals and values) in this 
context. For example, no role has been assigned to the Maori 
Fisheries Commission in the process, leading to the absence 
- 46 -
of any agency fully supporting the Maori perspective. The 
assumption seems to be that agreement on values and goals 
can be reached without an active role in the form of 
facilitation, mediation and general help, of Dutsiders. 
This appears an unrealistic assumption, given the resources 
needed to proceed through the Taiapure implementation process. 
Ingram and Schneider (1990:81) note that an underlying 
assumption of the 'support building' approach (characteristics 
of which are found in the Taiapure provisions) is that the 
political resolution of conflict overshadows substance in 
policy. The statutory design does not focus as much on the 
instrumental aspects of policy as on the political aspects. 
Here, the process may become an end in itself and an excuse 
for not achieving measurable results. This supports the 
proposition put forward earlier that the Taiapure provisions 
are a symbolic policy only. The emphasis on local discretion 
and iwi and hapu participation could be viewed as a political 
and highly symbolic action only, and it does not mean an 
intention of translating this sentiment into practice. Indeed, 
the climate promoted by the legalistic and formal procedures 
of the provisions, rather than promoting an environment in 
which mutual acceptance of diversity, or a process of consensus 
can grow, tends to result in frustration on the part of the 
applicants. 
Thus, although the characteristics of a 'support building' 
approach being found in the Taiapure provisions means an 
emphasis on support, it does not mean that the emphasis is 
grounded in reality. The design of the Taiapure provisions, 
with regard to the contextual characteristic of support, 
is not 'smart' enough. 
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5.4.2 Role of Knowledge and Certainty 
A fundamental principle of policy analysis is that the quality 
of the policy rests on the quality of information upon which 
it is based. The lack of information and context of uncertainty 
surrounding the policy may be crippling to implementation. 
Ingram and Schneider(1990:84) note that, when the level of 
knowledge of various kinds is low, statutuory design should 
provide incentives for implementers to add to policy knowledge. 
'Strong statute' advice leads to poor policy design for 
implementation under uncertainty and ignorance because too 
little is known to specify the elements of a policy logic 
that will fit reality. Thus, the detailing of rules in the 
Taiapure provisions to fit an unknown process dogged by conflict 
and ignorance, is a recipe for disaster. The goals of the 
policy will not be reached, as the means for getting there 
are inappropriate for the context. The result of this 
inappropriate strategy is unachievable goals and further; 
"if agencies are mandated by statute to reach goals that 
turn out to be unachievable, strong incentives will exist 
for agencies to engage in goal substitution and other 
strategies." (Ingram and Schneider, 1990:84) 
One of these 'other strategies' can be identified with the 
treatment of Taiapure proposals forwarded to MAF Fisheriei. 
and the Minister by the applicants. There are several examples 
of proposals that have been repeatedly sent back to the 
applicants for changes before they even get to the Minister 
to be approved of in principle. Criteria for a satisfactory 
proposal seem to change daily with detail being required 
one day, a summary of the issues the next and so on. It 
~ 
appears like a delaying process ensuring that hard decisions 
later down the track will not need to be made, and it keeps 
the applicants busy! 
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Ways of fostering more successful implementation in the context 
of misinformation and misunderstandings, could be found by 
making provision for an education programme on the rationale 
behind the Taiapure policy. This programme would focus on 
particularly the Maori point of view in an attempt to get 
understandings at a level with events. 
However, the design of the provisions, with its assumptions, 
rules and tools, does not make a provision of this kind. 
Instead, it seems to assume that once Maori take the initiative 
and start interacting with existing agencies and other resource 
user groups, the lack of knowledge and understanding and 
the uncertainty will be resolved. This is an unrealistic 
assumption, given the strength of differing value positions 
and the absence of a motivating rationale for other groups 
to attempt such an understanding. 
Examples of the Taiapure provisions failing 'to provide education 
on the rationale behind the policy, are especially visible 
with rel~tion to the Treaty of Waitarigi and its implications. 
~ 
The Treaty of Waitangi as the founding constitutional document 
of our nation, is of integral importance for the Taiapure 
provisions. There has been and still is, considerable debate 
over the versions of the Treaty, with the English and Maori 
versions differing quite dramatically in places. The written 
objective of the Taiapure provisions heeds this discrepancy 
and takes it up by letting both versions speak. However, 
by providing the English interpretation of rangatiratanga, 
the written objective is in effect setting up a conflict, 
a conflict that is further played out in the statutory framework 
of the provisions. In addition, the tools, rules and 
assumptions underlying the Taiapure framework do n~t pay 
heed to the 'essential bargain' of the Treaty, rather they 
emphasise the dominance of sovereignty and the Crown's right 
to exercise jurisdiction. 
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The knowledge and understanding of the Maori fishing right 
and rangatiratanga is minimal, with little if any attempt 
being made to clarify understandings. At no stage is the 
concept accurately clarified, rather it is baldly stated, 
giving groups the opportunity to take from the provisions 
what they wish. Perceptions of the provisions restrict the 
traditional right to estuarine or littoral waters. Whatever 
definition is subscribed to these terms, it is smaller than 
the traditional fishing right, which covers all areas where 
fish are to be caught including offshore reefs and inshore 
fisheries. Information related to Maori location of fish 
stocks has been well documented by the Waitangi Tribunal 
and substantiates a fishing right that is not limited to 
food gathering and spiritual uses. 
Rangatiratanga is one of the most fundamental aspects of 
Maori culture, it is derived from rangatira which is a sacred 
component of tikanga Maori. (A.Mahuika, National Radio, 1992) 
Rangatiratanga can have myriad meanings attributed to it, 
yet it is essentially about tribal self-determination and 
tribal authority and control. 
As well as not bothering to clarify the concept, the Taiapure 
provisions derogate rangatiratanga in several ways in their 
design. The burden of proof lying with iwi and hapu in 
proposing a Taiapure, contradicts rangatiratanga and article 
II of the Treaty which specifically guaranteed retention 
of the iwi's right of possession and full chieftainship over 
their taonga. Iwi and hapu should not have to identify and 
prove that areas of the sea are of customary significance, 
rather the duty should be with the Crown to identify and 
~ 
prove areas of non significance to Maori. (MFC,1992a:3) 
The pervasive influence of the Minister of Fisheries usurps 
the right to manage according to tikanga Maori, as does the 
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entire bureaucratic and intervention laden process; and finally 
the denial of the exclusive right to control access and use 
of the resource in a Taiapure area undermines the tangata 
whenua rights guaranteed in the Treaty. 
Rangatiratanga is limited and constrained in its implications 
within the Taiapure provisions. It is taken to mean whatever 
the legislation says. Its wings are clipped and consequently 
iwi and hapu are not allowed to fly. The written objective 
of the policy expresses admirable sentiments - symbolic though 
they may be - then this rhetoric is' subsumed within a rigid 
rules process allowing no real application of rangatiratanga. 
The Taiapure provisions do not attempt to 'add value ' to 
the context of uncertainty by, for example, providing education 
programmes. Instead they reaffirm the persistent 
misunderstanding, lack of knowledge and uncertainty that 
pervades the arena of Maori issues. 
are not a Ismart statute I . 
5.4.3 Role of Motivation and Capacity 
For this reason, they 
Tools, as the motivating element of the Taiapure provisions 
are identified as being little more than the symbolic written 
objective of the policy. The emotive aspects of this objective 
are intended to inspire the motivation necessary to proceed 
through the implementation process. It is noted that the 
strongest motivation to have a Taiapure established lies 
with the local people, Maori and other local resource user 
groups. Yet, linked with this locus of motivation is the 
assumption of the provisions that the applicants will have 
enough motivation to carry them through the long process 
~ 
which is full of potential veto points, and have the resources 
(time, money, legal and other expertise) to do so. 
The idea of allocating discretion to the local level is again 
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viewed as a viable direction to take for the provisions. 
More discretion at the local level means more control for 
the people directly affected by the policy, who will thus 
have vested interests in making the policy work. Yet, this 
'theory' does not consider the role that capacity to implement 
the motivation, plays. Capacity levels to implement the 
policy must go hand in hand with the motivation to undertake 
the action. It is ineffective transferring responsibility 
for policy implementation to the local level without an 
associated budget to carry out the implementation. Costs 
of running a Taiapure such as monitoring and enforcement 
costs are prohibitive to a locally funded group. 
The treatment of tribal systems in the Taiapure provisions 
too, plays the game of encouraging motivation without the 
necessary capacity being offered as well. The provisions 
acknowledge the presence of the tribal system and the importance 
of local control, yet they do not give this recognition backing 
in the form of resources. Without the resources in the form 
of management and information systems and financial capital, 
proposals are likely to fail. 
The burden of proof is also a major element that may be enough 
to kill motivation on the part of iwi and hapu entering the 
process. As far as the other agencies linked to the process 
are concerned, the provisions provide n01:.p.~1f9 to enhance 
. "'-----~~.-. ~~.-.-.-.. --
their motivation. They have no rules, obligations or incentives 
that would either require or encourage them to pursue the 
fulfillment of the Taiapure objective. They are not encouraged 
to assist Maori in taking inititiatives and those that would 
undertake this role, such as the Maori Fisheries Commission, 
have not been designated within the governmental sphere to 
do so. .. 
A case could be made, indeed, to argue that the tools, rules, 
and assumptions of the provisions are so stacked against 
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Maori, that the statute looks like it has been designed to 
block the creation of Taiapure, a case which supports the 
symbolic or hortatory argument proposed earlier. The provisions 
have vague goals, no provision of the means to achieve them 
and the underlying structure of the statute is so designed 
that it is very hard for the principal target group, that 
of te iwi Maori, to achieve them. Such,. conditions do not 
encourage the motivation to proceed through the Taiapure 
implementation process let alone enter them. They also do 
not allow many groups, particularly under-resourced iwi and 
hapu, to tackle the process even if they had the motivation, 
because they lack the capacity to do so. In these respects, 
the Taiapure provisions are not a 'smart statute'. 
5.4.4 Conclusions 
"Allocation of discretion should be sensitive to the locus 
of motivation, knowledge, capacity and support for each 
policy element. Discretion should be allocated to those 
levels and agents most likely to supply the values essential 
for effective policy." (Ingram and Schneider,l990:85) 
The above discussion has demonstrated the role played by 
the Taiapure provisions in terms of three key Gontextual 
characteristics. In each of the characteristics, the Taiapure 
provisions were shown to be lacking in their applicability. 
In section 5.2, the discussion of the context, areas were 
identified where value was needed to be added in order to 
facilitate successful implementation. 
The design of the provisions was then assessed, demonstrating 
elements of a 'support building' approach, especially in 
its depiction of vague goals. However, this approach is 
not entirely appropriate to the context, with the political 
goal of increased support and decreased conflict between 
Treaty partners not being substantive enough to meet the 
- 53 -
needs of rangatiratanga. Even if the 'support building' 
approach were 'smartly' applicable to the context, the Taiapure 
provisions did not adopt the approach throughout their design. 
Instead, rigid rules and procedures were espoused as a means 
for achieving Taiapure. These rules, creating an autocratic 
and strict policy framework, have been explicated as incapable 
of achieving the written objective, the recognition of 
rangatiratanga. 
As noted in the quote on the previous page, a 'smart statute' 
should be sensitive to the locus of motivation, knowledge, 
capacity and support for each policy element. Such a statute 
is unlikely to follow the advice of anyone school of thought, 
such as the 'support building' or 'strong statute' approaches. 
Instead, a mixed and complex context such as outlined in 
Chapter Two and assessed in this chapter, demands a mixed 
approach. The approach taken would ideally work on 'adding 
value' to those aspects identified as needing attention, 
such as practically g~ounding support for the policy, clarifying 
information that is central to the policy, and ensuring that 
motivation is encouraged and then backed up with the capacity 
to establish Taiapure. 
As they stand at present, the provisions do not meet the 
criteria necessary to be a 'smart statute', that is, the 
policy design does not link with the context in which it 
is to be implemented. A clear indicator of this shortcoming 
is the absence of any legislated Taiapure. No proposals 
have managed to get through all three stages of the process. 
This suggests that the Taiapure provisions do not work, they 
are not designed to achieve their written objective. 
The Taiapure provisions are not designed to achieve Utheir 
objective and they do not appear to recognise rangatiratanga 
for te iwi Maori. 
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CHAPTER SIX - CASE STUDIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters postulated that the Taiapure provisions 
are not a smart statute for te iwi Maori. This chapter tests 
this analysis by undertaking two case studies with Maori 
people who have been or are involved with the Taiapure 
provisions and its process. When undertaking a case study 
component it is necessary to articulate the way the research 
was conducted. In this way value positions and their potential 
effect on the information gathered are exposed. To this 
end section 6.2 outlines the methodological steps taken. 
Section 6.3 details the comments from the people interviewed 
and as a conclusion section 6.4 offers a brief comment on 
the relationship of the comments to the ~eport's analysis 
in Chapter Five. 
6.2 METHODOLOGY 
The basis for undertaking a case study component was to identify 
and verify the key issues addressed in the study's analysis. 
By practically grounding the study, the conclusions reached 
in the analysis are tested. Two groups were chosen as the 
sites of study, the hapu, ~2.,t1 Ke~Al~the North Island, 
and the iwi Ngai Tahu, from the South Island. These groups 
were chosen for two major reasons. The first reasoning is 
practical as Hammersly and Atkinson argue,1983:4 lithe role 
of pragmatic considerations must not be underestimated in 
the choice of a setting." The researcher is from the area 
where Ngati Kere is based, thus has personal acquaintance 
u 
with the hapu, and she is studying in the area of Ngai Tahu, 
thus has easy access to Ngai Tahu informants. 
The second reason for the choice of the cases, is to represent 
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the diversity that exists in reality. That is, the diversity 
in opinion, with a recognition of the value-plurality approach 
where no positions should be privileged and all understandings 
are equally valid; the diversity in the tribal system, by 
addressing both hapu and iwi levels, and the diversity of 
participation in the Taiapure process, with the groups being 
at various' stages of involvement. 
As well as articulating the methodological process, it is 
important to articulate the researcher's value position. 
The researcher, in this study is a young Pakeha women working 
for an essentially academic goal. She has constrained time 
and resource limits and brings her baggage of understandings 
and experience with her to the research situation. These 
understandings will necessarily influence her interpretations 
of the ·information and will add to the modification of the 
informants' comments. 
The seven interviews were taken in two easily identifiable 
stages. The first stage was undertaken in the North Island 
in mid to late August. Three of these interviews were held 
in Central Hawke Bay and one in Wellington and all took place 
within a week. The second body of interviews, in the South 
Island, took place in mid to late October, with two being 
held within two days and the third being held two weeks later. 
The major factor influencing the content of the information 
with this discrepancy in timing was the Sea lords Deal, announced 
at the end of August and deliberated over by iwi and hapu 
all through the period of interviewing. This meant the South 
Island interviews differed in emphasis though not in the 
basic views. 
" Approaches made towards gaining the interviews were influenced 
by the relationship the researcher had with the group in 
question. As previously mentioned the researcher had grown 
up in the Ngati Kere area, thus had extensive familial contact 
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with the informants. This necessarily influenced the interview 
process, often leading to longer interviews as family news 
was exchanged! The South island interviews were approached 
on a less informal note, the contacts having been made through 
previous study and not through familial means. However, 
the contact with the potential informants had been fostered 
by prior contacts, thus an element of trust had been 
established. Personal contact is acknowledged as an important 
factor in gaining information and the researcher found that 
a degree of familiarity with the informant aided the transfer 
of knowledge. 
The interviews took place in varying localities with the 
informants, who were incidentally all men, choosing the time 
and place. The empowering process of giving the informant 
the freedom to choose the interview time and place meant 
he could orient the interview proce~s, especially in terms 
of time and other commitments. The interviews varied in 
length, generally taking 1-2 hours, the shortest being half 
an hour and the longest being 2 hours long. The relative 
informality of the home interviews generally meant longer 
interviews, often with family members participating in part 
of the process. 
The interviews were of a semi-structured question format 
which guided the process but allowed flexibility for individual 
discretion. There were six questions, three broad questions 
and three more specific. The questions were: 
* What do you perceive as the issue/problem in fisheries? 
* How do you perceive rangatiratanga, what does it mean to 
you? 
* Do the Taiapure provisions address the issue outlined above? 
What are your general feelings about the purpose of Taiapure? 
* Who is involved in the process and what stage are you at? 
* Are there any problems or difficulties you have had with 
the process. Conversely, any positive points about process? 
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* Are there any changes you can recommend to help remedy 
the diffiGulties? What do you see for the future? 
The recording of the information in the interviews involved 
taking notes as each man spoke. The intention was to make 
recording non threatening and non-intrusive thus the choice 
of written recording rather than audio-tape. However, this 
meant there was a double interpretation of the information 
by the researcher, once as the men spoke and again when writing 
the comments up in this chapter. Thus, although the chapter 
is intended to be a collection of interpretations, the 
controlling power of the researcher in organising the 
information may mean the researcher's interpretation may 
be dominant and it is not simply the reflection of the 
informant's comments and views. 
In an effort to give as much controlling power to the informants 
as possible, the following section, 6.3, was sent to each 
of the men, giving them the opportunity to comment if they 
wished. 
6.3 INTERVIEWS 
The first group interviewed, that of the Ngati Kere hapu 
from Porangahau, are a major coastal section of the Ngati 
Kahungunu iwi of Hawke Bay. Their involvement in the Taiapure 
process is specifically linked with their hapu, although 
Ngati Kahungunu are supportive of their actions regarding 
the proposal. Ngati Kere embarked upon the path towards 
.' setting up a Taiapure back in November 1990. A meeting was 
held that month lito discuss increasing local concerns at 
the depletion of resources occurring in the coastarwaters 
from Blackhead to Cape Turnagain." (Porangahau Steering 
Committee,1992:3) This meeting led to a further meeting 
where it was decided a committee should investigate the 
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establishment of a Taiapure. The committee elected, completed 
this task by August 1991 and presented their findings to 
a public meeting. It was decided to go ahead with a Taiapure 
proposal for the area delineated, from Blackhead to Cape 
Turnagain. 
The Ngati Kere proposal is unique in its distinguishing 
characteristics. The steering committee putting the proposal 
together is evenly distributed in terms of its members. 
Half of the members are Ngati Kere and the other half are 
local Pakeha, many being farmers in the area. According 
to the people the researcher spoke to, Porangahau has got 
a headstart on the Taiapure process primarily because of 
the favorable Maori/Pakeha relations in the area. Porangahau 
is a small rural town with a small population base. Many 
of the residents in the village and surrounding area went 
to school together and have known each other for most of 
their lives. One informant contrasted this to a city situation 
where there are lots of people who all have differing views. 
Because there are so many people, it is near impossible to 
agree on anything fundamental. He goes on to say that 
Porangahau is the antithesis of this, with people getting 
on fairly well, and when there is disagreement, the numbers 
are so small that creases can be ironed out to an extent. 
He believes that the conditions in the area are right to 
achieve a Taiapure. 
The steering committee consists of twelve members. In the 
course of interviewing, three Ngati Kere members were approached 
and asked for comment on the policy and its process. The 
fourth informant is also of Ngati Kere descent, but is based 
in Wellington, thus is not part of the local committee. 
The men interviewed were; Mr Nick Scia Scia, Jim Hutcheson, 
Donald Tipene and Piri Scia Scia. Earlier on in the year, 
two other members (non-Ngati Kere) of the committee were 
interviewed. Their comments do not find their way into this 
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chapter rather were adopted in the researcher'S general 
analysis. 
At the moment the Porangahau proposal is with the Minister 
of Fisheries, having been sent off to go through the Taiapure 
maze in mid August, at the time of interviewing. The hapu 
can now do little more than wait and hope for a favourable 
reaction, having aspirations of getting through the process 
in record time, that is, within a year. 
The second group spoken to are not a discrete entity with 
a single Taiapure proposal as are Ngati Kere, rather, they 
consist of three individuals who though they belong to the 
same iwi, have differing hapu and runanga affiliations. 
"The tangata whenua within the Ngai Tahu rohe are the 
descendants of Ngai Tahu, Kati Mamoe and Waitaha. Ngai 
Tahu is considered the main tribe, the name being used 
for the con~ederation of peoples presently united under 
the Ngai Tahu Trust Board. Each descendent group maintains 
its individual standing by way of whakapapa." 
(Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, 1991:2) 
The informants, Donald Brown, Anake Goodall and Trevor Howse, 
are all of Ngai Tahu descent and all are involved to differing 
levels in the Taiapure process. None of the individuals 
spoken to are involved in a proposal for their own individual 
hapu or runanga but they have been involved with other hapu 
proposals. Their involvement is of a level that ensures 
they have a sound understanding of the issues enmeshed in 
the Taiapure provisions and its process.. As well as drawing 
on the comments from these three men, information shall be 
employed from a couple of these other hapu proposals in the 
Ngai Tahu rohe. Both the proposals, that of Kati Huirapa 
at Puketeraki and Kati Kuri at Kaikoura, are in a state of 
limbo at the moment with other events and issues capturing 
their attention. 
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The following discussion, reflecting the oral and written 
comments of the two groups, is organised around four main 
sections that derive from the questions asked. The sections 
concern; 
1) the issue in fisheries, 
2) the meaning of rangatiratanga, 
3) the Taiapure provisions: general perceptions and particular 
problems, and finally 
4) ideas for the future. 
The comments of all the individuals interviewed, from the 
North and South Islands, are considered. The sample of seven 
informants is regarded as being too small to attribute leanings 
to one Island or the other. An attempt to reflect the diversity 
of individual answers shall, however, be taken. 
When asked what they perceived as the problem or main issue 
in the fisheries equation, the informants gave a range of 
responses along a continuum: 
Cultural rights Degradation 
to the resource <---------------------------~ of the natural 
resource 
The issue appeared to exist on these two levels, that is, 
the problem was the mismanagement of the fisheries resource 
and its consequent overfished state and the issue of who 
had the rights to the resource under the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Most comments had an element of both levels with some being 
more oriented to one end of the continuum or the other. 
Two informants had comments that were largely in the realm 
of the resource problem. They regarded the management of 
the fisheries as being badly handled with the slaughtering 
of the fish stocks as a result. The situation is thus "trying 
to preserve what we've got and hope that it will get better." 
A recognition of the commercial role in the overfishing of 
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the fish stocks was also high on the agenda of these informants 
with a critical view towards our use of the resource: "there 
is too much emphasis on the dollar. We are selling the bread 
and butter out of our house. Selling the very resource on 
which we are based." Two other informants were more concerned 
with the denigration of Maori fishing rights in fisheries 
legislation, especially the 1986 Quota management system. 
The fisheries are noted as belonging to Maori in terms of 
the Treaty of Waitangi and they have been illegally 
. 
misappropriated by the Crown with such legislation as above. 
One man noted that the issues were not understood generally 
and the inflammatory media coverage aided this misunderstanding. 
Yet, despite their concern with their rights to the fisheries 
resource, thes~ informants were well aware of the resource 
aspect. As one of them said; "it is as much culture management 
as resource management." 
The remaining informants, too, were well aware of bo~h levels 
of the fisheries issue, with one informant specifying the 
existence of the two and giving primacy to the resource aspect. 
He said the core issue is the resource itself, and the 
management of this resource. The second level to him pertained 
to ownership of the rights to the resource. It was about 
a reconciliation of all perceived rights. 
When it came to considering the meaning of rangatiratanga, 
the seven informants were similar in their comments, with 
all highlighting firstly their perceived notion of 
rangatiratanga and then the difference between the concept 
and its often associated term, ownership. Each of the 
informants associated the term 'authority' with rangatiratanga, 
the differences being the authority to do different things. 
~ 
Some regarded it as the authority to grant or deny use and/or 
access to the fisheries resource, others saw it as the authority 
to make decisions without the "bureaucratic claptrap" and 
most rated an ability to assert this authority as being 
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important. The Crown were regarded as having a responsibility 
to provide Maori with the resources that are needed to make 
the decisions, for without the necessary resources the 
recognised 'rangatiratanga' carries little clout. 
Two of the informants emphasised the partnership in the Treaty 
highlighting the fact that there were other people involved 
than just Maori. They preferred to opt for a local emphasis 
than one exclusively iwi or hapu. Yet, they still accentuated 
the special affinity and responsibility Maori have for the 
~Jfisheries resource. Rangatiratanga to them is tied up in 
practices and protocol handed down over many years. It is 
not something that can be bought or suddenly earned, rather 
it is embedded in the Maori culture. 
As mentioned above, each of the informants noted the differences 
that existed between ownership and rangatiratanga. 
Rangatiratanga is about having the 'right' to fish, not about 
owning the fish. It implies an authority to caretake the 
resource, to wield kaitiakitanga or stewardship over the 
fisheries. It is not ownership in its own right but is 
inherently different and thus more than this. One of the 
informants regarded ownership as being a limited right and 
pointed to the Maori land trustees as an example. Here, 
the land is 'owned' by Maori, yet they have little or no 
control over the use of the land, this authority being held 
by the trustees. Overall there was a desire to separate 
the concept of rangatiratanga from that of 'Pakeha' ownership 
as it was felt that this association detracted from the full 
and true meaning of rangatiratanga. It was noted that there 
is a lack of understanding over the Treaty and its concepts 
such as rangatiratanga, with the ownership debate adding 
to the misinterpretations. 
The general perceptions held by the informants regarding 
the Taiapure provisions and their purpose, can be found to 
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follow a similar path. Initially there was positive reaction 
to the provisions as the following statements testify: 
"Finally some of our mana has been returned by the creation 
of the Taiapure." (Kaikoura Taiapure Proposal - Kati Kuri) 
-"A taiapure is a win-win proposal. The Ngai Tahu manage 
a fishery in their traditional way and obtain spiritual 
satisfaction from doing so. And over time both the Ngai 
Tahu and the wider community are able to restore and further 
develop what is now a rundown and depleted fishery." 
(Supplement to Kati Huirapa proposal:3) 
"The Steering Committee support the taiapure proposal as 
being positive policy designed to allow management to 
proceed and protect our kaimoana and waahi mahinga kai, 
and to foster responsible use of our resource, and to 
acknowledge true partnership." 
(Porangahau Steering Committee: 20) 
However, this optimism waned and the iwi and hapu involved 
tended to become cynical, some more than others. The view 
towards the provisions changed from being the saviour of 
mana to a mechanism that was "better than nothing" and had 
the potential to start the process towards recognition. 
As one informant said; "Taiapure isn't everything but its 
a start. It gets us a say and is a seed to start." Some 
of the informants were more dismal in their assessment of 
the provisions; "the Maori Fisheries Act was the only skeleton 
to hang fisheries rights on. Was the only vehicle available. 
Realised probably two years ago that it was worthless." 
Despite the view that the provisions were not going to deliver 
what they said they would, most of the informants believed 
in giving the process a go. One informant asked, "~hat price 
perfection? We have to take the best you can get." The 
general feeling was that perhaps the provisions should not 
be "chucked away" even though they were not perfect. Yet, 
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some of the informants believed that "the sooner the Taiapure 
process is got rid of the better." 
When asked to comment on any particular problems with the 
provisions and the process, the informants did not go into 
too much detail, perhaps feeling they had conveyed their 
opinion of the policy. Comments that did arise however ranged 
from a dissatisfaction with the definition of Taiapure to 
a dislike of MAF Fisheries' treatment of the policy, to the 
overall difficulty of the red tape burdened process. 
The process was identified as having too many constraints 
leading to nothing meaningful being able to be achieved within 
them. It is regarded as being purposely designed to be 
difficult thus taking up resources and energy of iwi and 
hapu that could be better directed elsewhere. This informant 
believed the process was made so difficult because the 
government agencies didn't really want it. Another informant 
supports this view by likening the process to chasing balloons 
which then pop after expending copious energy following them. 
The implied small area of a Taiapure is compared to a swimming 
pool which wouldn't be at all scientific and would be just 
a symbolic action rather than a meaningful accomplishment. 
One comment somewhat sums up the general feeling of iwi and 
hapu attempting to make the provisions work; "I have had 
difficulty finding the common sense in it." 
Ideas for the future of policy like Taiapure differed quite 
dramatically between the informants. Some of them hedged 
around the idea of exclusive areas as fulfilling the 
requirements of rangatiratanga, yet others regarded this 
type of thinking as 'radical' and would break up the 
partnership. This latter response preferred the path of 
involving locals, Maori and Pakeha, in the activities of 
management agencies that already exist. Those that support 
some degree of exclusivity advocate an extended version of 
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the Taiapure policy. The emphasis on traditional fishing 
practices is thought to be valid and important and should 
be elaborated upon. To be included in this extended policy 
is some utilisation of the rahui concept. 
Rahui is a tribal conservation mechanism for the protection 
of seafood and is generally used for two particular purposes: 
I} to declare an area tapu after a death or drowning so 
that people did not harvest food, swim or use the area 
until the tapu was lifted. 
2} to protect the vitality and productivity of fisheries 
in an area. 
(Donald Brown, pers comm) 
A fisheries rahui could declare a total ban, a ban on use 
except for those entitled to harvest, or allow the area to 
be fished under certain restrictions such as size limits. 
The concept is regarded as useful for its flexibility in 
the long term protection of seafoods and its particular 
significance as a traditionally employed mechanism, unlike 
the imposed Taiapure provisions. 
One informant gave a list of initiatives that he would like 
to see included iri the extended policy: 
- access to mahinga kai 
- protect urupa and waahi tapu 
establish kohanga which would give the ability to enhance 
and reseed 
- implement rahui within Taiapure 
- have exclusive areas 
- give some practical meaning to laws of Tangaroa 
- manuhiri to be guided by tikanga Maori 
The general view of the future of those who emphasise Maori 
rather than local rights, is to support anything that puts 
Maori rights forward in management and allows them to have 
the authority to control fisheries management according to 
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their tikanga. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The comments regarding the issue or problem in the fisheries 
equation support that identified by the analysis, that is 
the non-recognition of rangatiratanga. However it is seen 
that the analysis is firmly placed at the cultural end of 
the continuum of responses and thus tends to neglect a coverage 
of the resource issue. Yet, in line with the comment that 
the Maori fisheries issue is as much a culture management 
problem as a resource management problem, the analysis is 
found to embrace the resource issue. To help alleviate the 
pressure impacting on the fisheries resource, it is necessary 
to clarify and solve the relations of the fisheries resource 
users. Resource management is inextricably related with 
people management. 
Comments considering the concept of rangatiratanga testified 
to the level of knowledge and understanding held by te iwi 
Maori. They have an extensive understanding of the Treaty 
articles and their implications, and have definite ideas 
on how the articles should be translated in practice. They 
also demonstrated through their comments, the more general 
lack of understanding in the wider public. Not everyone 
is privy to information regarding the Treaty and its 
relationship to the fisheries resource, and further, not 
everybody wants to be. 
The informants raised an issue neglected by the analysis, 
and this was the role of the media in nurturing support for 
policies. Media coverage of the Maori fisheries is;ue, 
including that concerning the Taiapure provisions, is viewed 
as being inflammatory and hence has the potential to depreciate 
the support for implementation of the policy. 
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When asked if the Taiapure provisions addressed the problem 
of non-recognition of rangatiratanga, the comments given 
were similar to those tentatively put forward in Chapter 
Five. One informant when asked this question, gave an outright 
"no" as an answer, then backed his statement up by detailing 
the problems faced by iwi and hapu entering the Taiapure 
process. Overall, the conclusion was that the Taiapure 
provisions .didn't recognise rangatiratanga as te iwi Maori 
perceived it. However, unlike the analysis, which regarded 
the provisions as containing fundamental flaws for te iwi 
Maori, the informants believed in still giving the provisions 
'a go.' 
Particular comments regarding the details of the provisions 
were along the same lines as those exposed in the analysis. 
For example, the complex process, the lack of definition, 
the lack of resources, and the burden. of proof lying with 
the applicants were all targeted as being shortcomings of 
the provisions. 
One of the informants confirmed the analysis' proposition 
that the provisions were symbolic in their objective, and 
their framework just subsumed the admirable sentiments within 
a bureaucratic process, by likening the process to chasing 
a balloon. Another informant touched on the symbolism of 
the provisions with his reference to Taiapure the 'size of 
swimming pools'. 
In summary of these comments and in fulfillment of objective 
Two, the Taiapure provisions are not seen to recognise 
rangatiratanga from a te iwi Maori perspective. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This study has been clouded by the uncertainty caused by 
firstly, extensive government reform to fisheries legislation 
and secondly, the potential resolution of the Sealords Deal. 
In a climate in which nothing seems certain, it is not possible 
to provide specific options for the future. However, it 
has been possible to expose the underlying structural logic 
of the Taiapure provisions, assess the relationship of the 
provisions to its context and give some conclusions as to 
its fulfillment of its written objective. 
The written objective of the Taiapure provisions is to "provide 
for better recognition of rangatiratanga ••• in relation to 
fisheries ••• " The study concluded that this objective is 
not being fulfilled in a policy sense, as the policy design 
does not link with the context in which it is to be implemented. 
A 'smart' policy design would reduce value conflict and 
uncertainty, enhance understanding, and boost motivation 
and capacity for implementation of the policy. The Taiapure 
provisions do not undertake these steps in their design, 
thus are identified as not acting as a 'smart statute'. 
It is also concluded through the use of a case study approach, 
that rangatiratanga is not being recognised from a te iwi 
Maori perspective. 
These two conclusions necessarily lead to the third objective 
of the study - what recommendations for change can be offered? 
- 69 -
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations arising from this study are concerned 
with 'adding value' to those aspects identified in the analysis 
as needing attention. These aspects are found in terms of 
the three contextual characteristics. 
1) Support 
The 'support building' approach adopted by the Taiapure 
provisions, in an attempt to work with the broad value 
conflict that exists, is an effective stance. The 
written objective of the provisions is an admirable sentiment 
and the vagueness of its goal allows ample discretion 
for local value to be added. However, the practical support 
offered to applicants in the Taiapure process, particularly 
towards the target population of te iwi Maori, is 
insufficient. 
Extensive outside help to the applicants in the form of 
facilitation, mediation and expertise in the fields relevant 
to the establishment of traditional fishing areas, is 
needed. An agency fully supporting the Maori perspective 
is vital. They will then be in a position to take part 
in a process of consensus over the establishment of 
traditional fishing areas. Emphasis in this process is 
to be on the actual establishment of areas and isn't to 
circumvent the issue by having a purely political emphasis. 
2) Knowledge and Certainty 
The context of lack of knowledge and uncertainty needs 
to be addressed by the provision of education programmes. 
All resource user groups should be required to undertake 
a programme detailing the rationale behind suchupolicy 
as the Taiapure provisions. These programmes will be 
in the form of workshops where everyone gets an opportunity 
to have a-say. The only way to reduce uncertainty is 
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to put all the cards on the table in terms of the resource 
user groups' value positions. When, for example, the 
commercial user group has an comprehension of the te iwi 
Maori perspective, discussion can take place on an even 
level of knowledge. In this manner a degree of certainty 
is brought to the arena. 
The onus of responsibility for these workshops should 
not be on te iwi Maori, but on Government agencies, with 
consultation with te iwi Maori. In this way, Maori do 
not have to bear the burden of proving their position, 
and it allows the workshops to be an education experience 
for everyone, Maori and the other resource user groups. 
3) Motivation and Capacity 
The achievement of the above suggestion will necessarily 
have a 'trickle down' effect on the motivation of the 
groups involved in the establishment and management of 
traditional fishing areas. Through the consensus process, 
worked out at the education workshops, a implementation 
process that is less rigid in its procedures, will be 
determined. Applicants entering this process will be 
more motivated to stick with the process, in the knowledge 
that there will be plenty of discretion points. Agencies 
responsible for the process, will too, be motivated to 
champion the establishment of traditional fishing areas, 
with their added knowledge and certainty about their role. 
with the improved information and communication between 
the resource user groups and the agencies of responsibility, 
will come an efficient allocation of resources, which 
should enable a capacity to implement and establish Taiapure 
effectively. 
This set of recommendations involves adding value at restricted 
points, working with existing frameworks. However, in the 
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current climate of extensive fisheries legislation reform, 
there is the likelihood that existing frameworks will be 
abolished or changed beyond recognition. Thus, building 
on these frameworks could mean working with very shaky 
foundations. Rather than doing this, the study recommends 
taking the opportunity presented by the current climate. 
This climate is offering the chance to develop an entirely 
'value added' process instead of 'adding value' at restricted 
points. The recommendations on the previous two pages will 
playa central and guiding role in this change. 
The role of te iwi Maori in this process will be pivotal. 
They will have the responsibility for working out the details 
of the new provisions, modelling them on cultural traditions 
and practices. This responsibility, rather than being a 
burden of proof as with the Taiapure process, will be allied 
with the authority and capacity to carry out the management 
practices. 
This authority will be supported by the existing management 
agencies but not usurped by them. Ideally, national guidelines 
will be set by agencies and te iwi Maori, letting local hapu 
implement the details. Initiatives such as those proposed 
by an informant in Chapter Six will be adopted to a greater 
or lesser extent according to the wishes of the local people. 
By working on the recommendations offered to 'add value', 
an ideal end point such as that outlined below, can be reached. 
This 'ideal' programme is an attempt to provide a practical 
option for the future of traditional fisheries management 
in New Zealand. 
1) Have relatively small, exclusive areas of sea for the 
use of te iwi Maori. Maori are to decide on the area to 
be delineated with the understanding that once the area 
is chosen, it can not be changed. This will involve 
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difficult decisions for iwi, but it will alleviate 
problems regarding future claims over an area. Activities 
in the area are entirely the prerogative of te iwi Maori. 
2) Have a larger area (suggest out to 1.5/2 miles) of sea. 
The area is to be managed in the manner of a Taiapure, 
that is, by the local people. The management committees 
for the area should be representative of the resource 
user groups in the community, with a certain number of 
local iwi being present. Activities in the area will 
be subject to negotiation by the management committee. 
3) The third level of the programme recognises the rohe concept 
where iwi have authority over the whole tribal coastline. 
This authority is subject to existing legislation, with 
the implementing agencies having the responsibility of 
actively consulting te iwi Maori in regards to activity 
in the area. 
Within the guidelines of this programme, locally based people, 
te iwi Maori and other resource user groups, can determine 
the activities most appropriate for them. 
Finally, this study recommends that future research be 
undertaken in the area of traditional fisheries. This is 
especially important with the historic Sea lords Deal going 
ahead. The Deal will have extensive implications for 
traditional fisheries, both in terms of their existence and 
their management. An assessment of these implications is 
vital for the overall management of our fisheries resource. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Reference to the Taiapure provisions is referring to 
the legislative details set out in Appendix Two and the 
implementation process supporting the legislation, set 
out in Appendix Three. 
2. There were in fact five variations of the English text 
circulated in Hobsonts official dispatches in 1840; the 
English text we know today is the document that was taken 
to hui at Port Waikato and Manukau where it was signed 
by Hobson and 39 rangatira. 
(Williams,1989:77 in Kawharu,1989) 
3. A term coined by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment to describe the fundamental agreement contained 
in the Treaty. (PCfE,1988:6) 
4. Manutu Maori underwent a transition in June 1992 to Te 
Puni Kokiri, or the Ministry of Maori Development. 
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Appendix.1. The Treaty of Waitangi 
. I MAORI VERSION 
Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi 
Ke kupu whakatakl . 
, . 
Ko Wikitoria te Kuini 0 Ingarani i ta~ mahara atawai lei ngll rangatira me riga liapQ 0 Nu Tirani 
i tana hiahia hold., kia' tOhungia ld a ralou 0 ratou rangatiratanga me to ralou wenua' a Kia mau 
t0011 hoki te rori'go ki a ..atou me t~ Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea t~ Ida tukua mai tetahi 
rangatira hei kai wakarite ki. ngll Tangata Mllori 0 Nu Tirani kia wakaaetia e ngllrangatira Mllori 
,te Kawanatanga 0 te Kuini ki ngll wllhikatoa 0, te wenua nei me ngll motu - nll te mea hold he 
tokomaha ke nlla, tangata a tona lwi kua noho ki tel!ei wenua a e haere mai net . 
Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga lda kaua ai nga kino e puta mai ki te 
tangata Mllori ki te Pllkeha e nohoture kore ana. 
Na kua pai teKuini kia·tuk~ ahau a Wiremu Hopihona he ~pitana i te Roiara Nawi hei Kawana 
mo ngll wllhi laitoa, 0 Nu Tirani i tukua aianei a mua atu ki te Kuini e mea atu ana ia ki ngll' 
rangatira '0 te wakaminenga 0 nglla hapu 0 Nu Tirani me era rangatira atu'enei ture ka KOrerotia 
nei. 
, , 
Ko Te Tuatahi . . 
Ko ngll rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga me ngll rangatira katoa hold, ldhai i uru ki taua Wakaminenga, 
ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini 0 Ingarangi, ake tonu alu te Kawanatanga katoa 0 0 ..atou wenua. 
, , 
Ko Te Tuarua 
Ko te Kuini 0 Inga~ngi ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nglla rangatira, ld nga hapQ, ki n~ll tangata katoa 
o Nu Tirani, te tina rangatiratanga 0 0 ..atou wenua cj ratou kainga me o. ratou taonga katoa. 
Otiia 'ko ngll rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga ,ine ~gll rangatiia katoa atu, ka tuku ki te Kuini te, 
'. hokonga 0 era Wahl w~nua e, p~i ai te tangata nona te wenua, ki te ritenga'o te utu e ~karitea ai 
e rlltou ko te Jcaihoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kaihoko mona. . 
. Ko Te Tuatoru 
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo' te wa~aetanga ki te KaWanatanga:o te Kuir,ti. Ka tiakina e te 
Kuini 0 Ingarangi ngll tanga~ ¥lIori katoa 0 Nu Tirani. Ka tukua Id a ratou ngll tikanga katoa 
rite tahi ki alia mea ki ngll tangata 0 Ingarangi. ' .. 
Na, ko ~atou ko ngll rangatira 0 te Wakaminenga 0 ngll hapQ 0 Nu Tirani k3 huihui nei ki 
Waitan~ komatou hold ko ngll rangatira 0 Nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga 0 enei kupu.: Ka 
tangohia k3 Wakaaetiakatoatia e matou. Koia ka tohungiaai 0 matou ingo~ 0 diatou tohu. 
Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te ono 0 ngll rao Pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e waru rau ~ wa te 
kau 0 to tatou Arild. 
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, Treaty 0/ Waitangi: a liural English translation of the Maori text 
(Signed at Waitangi February 1840, and afterwards by about 500 c~iefs) 
VICfORIA, the Queen of England, in her kind (gracious) thoughtfulness to the Chiefs and Hapus 
of New Zealand, and her desire 'to preserve to them their chieftainship and their land, and that 
peace ~nd quietness may be kept with them, because, a great number of the people of her tribe have 
settled in this rounlly, and (more) will rome, has thought it right to send a chief (an officer) as one 
who will make a statc:ment to (negotiate with) Maori peopl~ of New Zealand Let the Maori chiefs 
accept the govern~rship (KAWANATANGA) of the Queen overall parts olthis country and the 
Islands .. Now, the Queen desires to arrange the governorship lest evi1s should come to the Maori 
People and the Europeans who are living here without law. No~, the Queen has been pleased to 
send me, William Hobson, a Captain ~'the Royal Navy'to be Governor for all places of New 
Zealand 'which are now given up or which shall be given up' to the Queen.: And she says to the 
Chie~ of the Confederation of the Hapus of New ,Zealand and the other chiefs, these are the laws 
spoken ~f. 
Article the Drst 
The Chiefs of the ronfederation, and all these chiefS who have not joined hi that Confederation give 
, , , 
. up to the Q1:Ieen of England for ever all the Governorship (KA W ANA T ANGA) of their lands. 
Article the second 
The Queen of England agrees and ronsents (to give) to the Chiefs, hapus, and all the people of New 
Zealand the full chieftainship (rangatiratanga) of their lands, their villages and all their possessions 
, (~onga: everything that is held precious) but the Chiefs give to the Queen the purchasing of those 
pieces of land which the, owner is willing to ,sell~ subject to the arranging of payment which will be 
agreed to by them and the purchaser who will be appointed by the Queen for the purpose of buying 
. . 
for her. 
Article the ihIrd 
This is the ariangement for the ronsent to the governorship of the Queen. ,The Queen will protect 
'. aU the Maori people of. New zealand, and give them all the same rights as those of the people of 
England 
WILLIAM HOBSON, Consul and Lieutenant-Governor 
ArtIcle the rourth 
Two chur~runen, the Catholic Bishop, Pompallier and'the AnglieanMissionary William ~Ienso 
Jrerorded a dJscussion on what we would caU religious freedom and customary law. In answer to a 
·direct questJori from Pompallier,' Hobson agreed to the following statem'ent. It was read to the 
. meeting, ~ore any of the chiefs had sign~ the Treaty. ' . 
E: m~ 'aHa. ie Kawana ko nga whakapono katoa 0 Ingarani, 0 nga Weteriana, 0 Roma, me te 
rit,enga Maori hold etiakina ngatahitia e ia. 
'" Translation: 
. The, GoVernor says that the ~eral faiths (beliefs) of England, of the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also 
Maori custom shall alike be protected by him: 
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Preamble 
ENGLISH VERSION 
The Treaty or Waltangl 
Her Majesty, Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ir~land, regaraing with 
her Royal Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand, and anxious to protect their just 
Rights and Property, and to secure to them the enjoyment of Peace and ~ood Order, has deemed , 
it necessary, in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled 
in New Zealand, and the rapid exte~ion of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is 
still iii progresS to constitute and appoint' a functionary 'properly authorised to treat with the 
Aborigines of New Zealand for the recogDition of Her'Majesty's Sovereign authority over the whole 
or any part of these islan~. Her Majesty'tperefore being desirous to establish a settled 'form of Civil " 
Government with a view to averting the evil conseque~ces which must res .. tt .from the abse~ce of 
the necessary Laws ~nd Institutions alike to the Native population and to Her Subjects has peen 
graciously pleased to empower and authorise me William Hobson, a Captain in Her Majesty's Royal 
Navy, Consul, and Lieulenan~-Governor of such, parts of New Zea1~nd as may be or hereafter shall 
be ceded to Her "Majesty, to inodte 'the confederated and independent Chiefs of New Zeaiand to 
concur in the following Articles and' Conditions, 
Article the first 
The chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and 
independent, Chiefs who have not become members of t.he Confederation, cede to Her Majesty the 
Queen of England, absolutely and without reservation, all the rights and powers of Sovereignty 
which the said Confederation or Indi~dual Chiefs respectively exercise or ~ssess, or may be 
supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the ~ole.Sovereigns thereof, 
Article the second 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New 
Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof, the full.exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of the Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries, and other properties which they may 
collectively or individually possess, so long as it is their wish and desire to maintain the ~me in their 
possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and tlIe Individual Chiefs yield ioHer M:ajesty the 
exclusive right of Pre.emptlon' over such la~ds as. the proprietors thereo"f may be disposed to 
alienate, at such prices as may.be agreed upon between' the respective proprietors and persons 
appointed "by Her Majesty to treat With ihem in that behalf. 
Article the third 
~ consideration thereof, Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of Neyv- Zealand 
Her Royal Protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British subjects." 
W. Hobson, Lieutenant-Governor 
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ArtIcle the rourth , 
Now therefore, We th~ Chiefs of the Confederation of-the United Tribes of New Zealand being 
assembled in Congress at Victoria~ in Waiiangi and.We the Separate and Independent Chiefs of New 
z.eal~d'.claiming authority over the Tribes·and Territories whic~ are specified afte'r our respective 
nameS having been made fully to understand the ?roviSion of the foregoing Tteaty~ accept and enter 
into the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof. . In witness of which, we have attached our 
signa~res or maries at the places and the dates. respectively specified. ' 
Done at W~tangf, this s~h day of February in' the. year of Our Lord .. one thousand eight, hundred 
and forty • 
. ,. 
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MPENDIX .. 2.: TAIAPURE SECTION OF THE MAORl 
FISHERIES ACT 
·"PART IlIA 
'7 AlAPURE-Loc.u. FI.SHl!lUES 
"54,,- Object-The object of this Part of~ Act is to ~e, 
1 relation to areas of New Zealand fishenes waters (bcmg 
. ;tua.rine or littoral coastal waters) that have cwtomarily been 
.: f spedal signilic:mee to any iwi or hapu either-
"(a) AJJ a source of food; or 
.• "(b) For spiritual or cultural ~,- . 
. etter proVISion for the r~eogrut1on o~ rangatlr3.!anga and of 
1e right secured in relation to fishenes by Article n of the 
reaty of Waitangi. . 
"54a. Declaration of taiapurc-Iocal 6sberies-(l) Subject 
) subsections (2) an? (3) of this see.tion. the .cov~or.~nera1 
lay from time to tune, by Order m Council published m the 
mite, declare any area of New Zeiland fishenes w~ters (being 
Ituarine waters or littoral coastal waters) to be a tlllapure.local 
. ;hery. 
"(2)An order under subsection (I) of this section may be 
lade only on a ~mmenda.tion made by the Minister in 
:cordance with this Part of this Act. 
"(3) The Minister shaD. DOt n:commend the ~ of an 
-der under subsection (I) of this section unless the Mlmster is 
.dsfied both- •• • 
"(a) lhat the order wi1l further the object set out m s~n 
I . 54A of this Act; and 
"(b) lhat the making of the order is .appropriate having 
regard to-
u(i) The me of the area of New Zealand fisheries 
watCIS that would be decI.a.red by the order to be a 
. • ureb::alfishcry; and ta!!~ 'Ihe ~ of the order on the general welfare 
of the commuoity in the vicinity or the area that 
would be· decJ.a.red by the order to be a tai.apure-l~ 
fish • and . "~The impact of the . order on those persons 
havmg a ~ intc:rcst in the area that would be 
. dec::laied by the order to be a taiapure·local fishery; 
and . . 
... ~v) The impact of the order on fisheries 
Inanagcinent. 
"54<:. Proposal for c:stahlishm.ent of taiapurc-local 
ihery-(I) Any ~n may submit ':,0 the Director-General a 
oposal for the istablisbment of a talapure·local fishery. 
"(2) The proposal- . . . . 
"(a) Shall contaiD a d.escripti~n ?f the PI?posed taiaeure.local 
fishery: which desenpDOn shall mclude partIculars of 
. the ~ area. and boundaries of the proposed 
taiapure-local fishery; and . . 
"(b) Shall desaibe- . .. .. 
"(~ Maori, traditional, reaeational. commercial. 
and other interests in the proposed taiapure.local 
fishery: . . 
"(b)The species of aquatic life in the proposed 
taiapure.local fishery that are of parucuIar 
imponance or interest. 
"(3) The proposal shall-
"(a) State why the area: to whicI; th~ p'roposal relat~ ~as 
. cwtomarily been of special Slgriificanee to an 1W1 or 
haeu either- . 
'(i) As a source of food; or 
"(it) For ~~iritual or ~n;raI reasons: 
"(b) Sec out the polices and obJect1ves of the proposal: 
"(c) Contain ~cL other p~culars as the Direetor-G<:neral 
considers appropnate. 
··54n.1nitial consideration of proposal-(l) The 
Director-Gc:u.eral shaH refer to the Minister everr.. proposal 
submitted to the Di.rector-Gc:neral in accordance WitIi section 
54<: of this Ad:. 
C
f(2) If the Minister. after amsultation with the Minister of 
M.a.On A1fairs. and after having regard to the provisions of 
section 548 (8) of this Ad, agrees in principle with the proposal. 
the Minister shaD. autborise the Director-Ceneral to publish. 
notice of the proposal in the Gautte. . . . 
"(3) The pro~ shall be available for public impection for a 
perlOO. of DOt less than 2 months. after the date of the 
pub1icadon in the Gautte of the notice of the proposal .. 
"(4) The notice sball specify the office of the Maori Land 
Court in which objectioni to the proposal may be lodged. 
"(5) If the Minister. after ~nsW.tation with the ~er of 
MaOn AfFairs and after havmg regard to the provmons of 
section 54a (5) of this Ad, does not ag;ee in principle with the 
proposal. the Director-General shall monn the person who 
made the proposal that the proposal will not be r~ 
further as the Minister does DOt agree with it in prmdple. 
"54£. N~tice of ~roposal:-1I) The notice authorised under 
section 54D (2) of this Act shall be published at le:ast twice, with 
an interval or not less than 7 days between each notification of 
the proposal. in the metropolitan newspapers and in a 
newspaper cirrula.ting in the locality of the area to which the 
proposal relates.' . 
"(2) A copy of the proposal shall be deposited in-
"(a) The office of the Maori Land Court nearest to the 
locality of the area to which the .proposal relates; 
and 
u(b) 11I.e Ministry's Head Office; and . 
"(c) The office of the territorial authority for the area to 
which the proposal relates; and . . . 
"(d) The office of the regional council for the area to which 
the proposal rmtes. . 
"54r. Objections to, and submissions on, proposaI-
(I) ~y person or public authority, local authority. or any body 
s~cilly constituted by or under any Act. and any Minister 
of the Crown, which or who has any function. ~wer, or duty 
which relates to, or which or who is or could be iffected by, any 
aspect of the proposed taiapure·1ocal fishery may, .\\liUUn 2.' 
m"nths of the publication in the QueUe of the proposal. lodge 
at the office of the. Maori Land Court specified pursuant to 
section 54D (4) or this Act-
"(a) An objection to the 'proposal; or 
"(b) Submissions in relation to the proposal; or 
"(e) Both. . .: . ,.' .. , 
"(2) Any such objection and any such submissions- .. 
"(a) Shall iden~ the grounds on which the objections or 
submissions are made; and . . . . . . 
"(b) Shall be mpplemented by such particulars and 
infonnatiOri. as the R.q;strar of the Maori Land 
Court notifies the apelic:ant the Registrar of the 
Maori Land Court c::oiISiders. n~ to suffidendy 
identify. the grounds of the objection or. the 
mbmiSsions.. . . . .... .. .., .. '. 
"5~ InCJuhy by tribunal-(I) A public inqtiliy shaD. be 
conducted mto all objections and submissions recaved under 
section 54, of this Ad:. . . 
"(2) The inqu!ry shall be conducted by a tribunal consiSting 
of a Judge of the Maori Land Court appointed by the Chid 
Judge of the Maori Land Court. . 
"(3) The Chief Judge of the Maori Land Couit IIlll}' direct 
that the tribU03l c:oilducting the inqu,iry conduct it with 
assistance of one or more assessoa to be appointed by the 
Chief Judge for the purpose of the inquiry. 
"(4) In cousidcring the suit3hility of any penon for 
appomtment as an assessor. the Cbief}~dge of the Maori Land, 
Olurt slWl have ,rcgud notooly to thit penon's ~onal 
attribUtes 'but also, to that' person's knowledge orand 
. experience in the, ~~ aspects' of mattCl'S lik.dY to be the 
subject.matter·of the mq~." " ' . • ' 
"(5) The trib~. shall ~ ?eemed to b~ a CommisSion, of 
Inquiry under the';CommlSStons of InctWIY Act 1908 and, 
su6ject to the p~or:this Act, aU the pro~ons of that 
Act. cxceptsccttons lQ. to 1.2. shall apply accordingly. ' 
,: "(6) The ~ who subIititted the,proposal to the Director· 
Genera.t the MiniSter; or my ~0na1 ~ouncil or local authority 
,whose'region or distric;t is idfectedby the'pro~a! and every 
badyand ~n. which or who made subllllSSlons on or 
objected to the. proposal uDder. section 54F of this Act,shaIl 
have theridlt to,~ present and be. heard. at evcx:y inquiry 
, conducted liy .the', triJ:iunaI Wlder this section, and 'may be 
represented by, counSel or dlJly authorised representative 
"(7) A tn"bunaI ap~inted Under this section may, if the Chief 
Judge of the Mien ~'Court so directs~ conduct any 2 or 
more inquiries ~g~er n~thst.I:D~ that they relate to 
different areas or aifferent ~ orany area. .. 
, "(8) On compIcdDa or the bJuh'T.. the cribunal slWI. having 
~ to the povisblI'of' ~ 6U (!) of this ~~ , 
\a) Make,a rqJOrt,and. recommmcJ:atiQns to the MioistCr on 
, ,', the opjccdDns and':Submi~ made to it.. which 
. ," ~ ,.and recommendallOos may ,mdude 
,": RconimCzidc;d amc:ndmentsto the propOsal; or , 
"(Il) Rccouimc:ud to the'MiD.istc' that no.action Le taken as a 
': ' result of the objcc:tiOns and submissions made to it. 
"(9) 'Ihe' M:inisU:r. ·'after W::ini into account: the ~ and 
recornmmdatioias Of'the tribunal" md after ha.~ regard to the 
..........moDs of' section·fts ~) o£.this ~ and after cOnsulta.tion 
~the Mhiistcr ofMaari. .A.tWrs.-, 
"(a}Uay- ,:,: :,,;' " ," ' .' '.' , 
, ""(i) AO::ept those'recornmendations; or ' 
, . ~, : ' "'(ii) Ikdine;' to ", aa:c:Pt .. all ,or any of those 
, .- '·rcoomme.ndahoos; and ' , 
"(b)S~ P'lb.lishinthe:~ '" • ' 
, . , ' "~ The, J.'CPOrt.,,:and,recommendalions of the 
'. '~:iDd .'.. '" ' 
, ' .,:': . "(il)ne d~ "of ilie ~er on the ~ 
. ' , ·and ~end,tJons of the triJ:nmaI... ' 
, "(19) SUbject, tc?,~ ~H, of !.liis ~Ct, 0;0. appeal Shall lie 
~m VlY,rqxirt or,~~auon'~ ~COSlOIl made under 
"this ~~.~ .. :, ~~·.~ ... ~:·t ... '":.,;.:':.',(:\;~·.": .. '_~'.~~ i ~.. • • : I 
, ,"S4='AP 'eaf.o~ ~CsdoD or 'law~Where any patty to 
',an ' , 'midei-slm'oitf54G of this' Act. befOl'C a tribUnal 
" ap~~ un ~'~ 5,~ of this Nit t(dissatisfied:with ~e, 
" =ea::~~~~~~::r'~:::o:ilie~f c;;o~ ~yWa}j of ~ ~Cd. for die. ~iilIOn ot the fourt on a, 
, quesuoi1' of Iaw:;Oaly. and. dic:p~ons of :subsections (2) to 
(l1)o(~s~ .,:t~~ ~~, of~eaion~6.2A. of ~e Town and 
thUn~,:,:.l~1anning . Act -:1977" S~':'W1th,any "necessary 
:C:!ditiJtEt!t~'J!i~= jfu '~ l;t"mpC: 
: ot a '"etenrunation.ofthc;' Planning 1;n~;:r unPIer the Town 
'and Country l'bnnint~:·~9l7. ::". ," 
. ,"54i. Po~ of Miniscu to recommend declarad~n of 
taiapure-iocal ~:' Jishery-Where ,"a ,,: prt!posal for, the 
estaolisliment of a biapUre.IOcal fishery his 6cen made under 
:.section 5,4c of this AJ:.t. and either aiiYJ>roceedings in relation to 
that pioposaI (mdui:ling' any proceidiilgs taken under sections 
SfF to 5tH of this Act, in rclition to diat proposa1) hll:ve been 
'~posed of or' the, time for taking' any s~ch proceedings has 
, ! 
c?cpired. the M.inister shzIl. if S1tisfied that a recommendation 
should be made under section 54. (2) of this Act. m:d:c that 
recommend.don l.COJl-dingIy. ' • 
A5~: Management of taiapure-loCat 6.shery-{llThe 
~er. after: consultadon with the Minister of MaOri.Mfair:s. 
~ fifre:;~, a ~mmitt~ of mamg~ for ~, taiapure-
"(2)The. oonUDktee of manag~ may be any existing 
body corporate. ' ", ",: ' , ' 
, "(5) The committee of ~cnt shall be ~~ oil 
the nomination of J>C!SOns who appear to the Minister to be 
repres~e ~ me local Maori commlmio/~ : ' ' 
A(4).Th.Cj::oJJUJlittee of management shall hold office at the 
pleasure of the ~er. ", ' 
"Mit. Po~ ~' recommend maimg of ieguladoDS-
(l}A committee of mamgement appointed for a taiapure-loCd 
6.Sh~ ~y,recommena to the Minister the Diaking 'of 
~ Under section 89' of this Act. for the conservation 
'ana mana~cnt of the fish, aquatic life. and seaweed in the 
taiapu.i'6loCal &shery. " " " ' , ' 
MC!) R~rlonS made WIder section 89 of this Act pursuant ' 
to sUbsect1on(l) ?fthls section may ovcnide the provisions of 
any other ~ma~e ,under that sc:ction or the provisions 
ormy ~ management plan., ' ,: ' 
, "{3} Except t~ the extent that any r~tions ~e under 
Section 89, I)f ¥ Act pursuant to subsection (1) of this section 
o\'enideor'ue otherwise mconsistent with the provisions of 
any otherregulatiollS made under that section or of any &shery 
nianagcriient, p~ those. provisions shall, apply. in relation to 
every taiap.',D"C-IOcallishery. ' " " • ' ' 
, ' W(4) Any' prQ\ision of regulations made under section 89 of 
" 'this Act.ihit-rdates only to a taiapwdocaI fishery may be 
made only in accordance with subsection (1) of this section. . 
"(5) Afay p!m~n of a &shaY management plan that rdates 
only to a, wa.pure·locaI fishery: may I)e included in that· plan 
, only on the recommendation Of the committee of management 
of thattaiapare.loc3.t fishery. " : ' 
"(6) Nq regulationS made under s~tion 89 of this Act shall. 
pro\ide ,for any pc:rson- , '. " ,',' " ; . 
,,' "(a) To be ri::~c~ access to; or'the use of, any tai3pw'e.locaI 
,', ;. &shc:r)r; 91" ;' " " ,,: ' ' 
"(b) To be,reqUired to leave orceale to use any taiapqre.locaI 
, ":,' 6Sh!="Y.~, , ' " 
by n:a.son cartb,c colour., r.a.c:c, « ctbnic or natiooI.l origins of 
" t6at. pcrsoo. .oC ~ :my re1a.tM: « usocia~e of that p=on.. '. ' 
, . . . ' '. '. r "'~:' .. ;. '" " -: ", ~.'. 'r .' 
, ..... " 
,.' 
". ~ ,,' 
," 
'. ~. ". 
., 
~ .. ," ,.' 
" . 
. ,*: ~ • 
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APPENDIX':!: 
T AIAPUlrnAPPLlcATION PROCESS ELOW DIAGRAMS 
This diagram show~: '. -_ 
- -
· '. ' The st~g~' involv~d ,in the ap~lication proCess . . ' 
• The tirn~when'iwior users may interactwith,each'other or Gover~ment agencies. - .' - . , 
'f 
• HowT:ilapure may: b~ implemented . 
. ; '. ~ . . 
, " . 
STAGE ONE: nU~jAIAPURE J:»ROPOSAL 
2. 
3. 
4.· 
5., 
6. 
7. 
.,," ." .. ' 
Iwi rupport~]r= propo,~ 
Appli~t :a:pp'frlachesMAF Fi~heries fodnformation -on 
Taiap~ p~+~ <kVetopmen; '.. . .' 
• / ' , ., w • - . ~ .. ~. . '. ,'. . 
· MAE Fisheri~'can. provide information on contacts so that a . - .. . ',' 
· meeti~g Wi~.trplkanBand 00,,, ~ncies can be arranged 
hyl develop 'a ,draft prop9sal' -.--'- : ' ',' ,;: ,}J.' -~',:: '-~ -, . 
, .. ",:. 
Iwi gain ~iews of4ser g;oups on draft proposal <' . ., '" i/ '~", .': ..... ':, ._ . 
ApplianF~ s~i}~~~~ T~ap~re. ProP9salto the' 'Director Geh~r~:, Minisio/, 
.: , ' . . r~ :.... . " . ... . _ ..'." " >'", 
of Agriculture·and Fisheries clo the Regional M~ager, MAP F.ishe'r,ies [,5:4C(1)] 
. c· ~:' _> ",. " '" 
,MAF, Fi~hdti~1~9~ ;0'-t~e' Minis-tee of Fi~hefi~onth~ pr~~o~al,: ' , 
· [540(1)]' ,:.;;):;,' - .' - ',. . . " . ., .';, 
• ":,'/;f(i+: 
• ~ •• ' • :. • ,.- _ "' .... " f ~ " :". • 
T.he 'Minister, of fisherien:onsults with the Minister of Maori 
" ' Affiur~ .£54D(~)f: '. : >' ,,' . ," , ,'. ' ·,(t 
" ' 
,. ";. , 
-. .: } 
,." "; 
The Mirii'st~r 4,Fisheries de~deS' in 'principle to t~e proposal 
\:..-'. .'. . ,.'. ' .".. '; ;~ ~ '. '. . . .' 
Application ref~ri:ed' 
. bac.:k. toap'plicants',' 
[54D(2)1: .·...1 I. 
'YES 1....., ---.,----'-~----:-c,_--.......... , NO 
, '. 
.:.. 88...,. 
' .. 
STAGE TWO: THE MAORI LAND COURT TRIBUNAL HEARING 
1.. Notice of the proposal is published in the Gazerte [540(2)] 
+ . . 
2. MAF Fisheries: 
+ Publishes notice of the proposal in national and local 
newspapers [54E(1)] 
+ Sends a copy of the proposal to the District Maori Land COUrt. 
the Territorial Authority and the Regional Council [54E(2)] 
.+ Sends a copy of the Gazette notice to the Applicant 
t . 
3. Second publication of notice of the proposal published in the Gazette 
[54E(1)] 
4. Submissions and objections received by the Maori Land Court 
Registrar [54F(1)] t 
YES 
l 
NO 
5. P bl" ., + b .. d b' . b h T' . T 'b al u IC 10qutry 1Oto su miSSions an 0 Jectl()ns y t e atapure f1 un 
headed by a Judge of the Maori Land Court [54G(l),(2),(6)] 
" . 
6. Tribunal repom to the Minister of Fisheries. [54G(8)] , .'. 
7. Minister of Fisheries consults with Minister of Maori Affairs 
. and·makes a decision. [54G(9)] , . ',' 
8. Minister of Fisheries publishes in the Gazette the:· 
,+ Triounal Report . 
+ Tribunal Recommendations 
+ . Ministers Decision [54G(9)(b)] 
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SEVEN 
DAYS 
TWO 
MONTHS 
TIME 
UNKNOWN 
ONE 
MONTH 
[162(3)T&CPA]* 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Notice of Appeal to High C~un on points oflaw stemming fro~ the 
" ' 
. Tribunal repon ~d recommendations' [54H -MFA, 162& 162A-T &CPAj 
. 1 '.LNO ' 
t " 
Case stated lodged with Tribunal l , ;-
High COun' hTing and decision 
' STAGE THREE: SETIING UP THE TAIAPURE 
1. Mini'~ter ofFisheri~ recommends' the Governor General declare 
a Taiapure by Order In Council [54B(l),(2)] 
- + " , ' . 
} 
} 
US L NO ------I, ~~ l -'. , 
, 2. Notice ofTaiapure ~eclaiation published inthe Gazette 
(548(1)]< + ' , . " .,. ' 
: " .' ::.!.- ' ! .' .~ .. : ~ .. ' . 'I ~' ' .;. ~ -':. ,:,~ ,: '"~''' • •• ':'~'" : •• • ~. " .;. , " 
:Minister ippoiilts Ta!apure Management Comm}riee ' . 
.. . " '.::: :'-.; : .... ,, ; .' :~. " ',," . . .. '. -; .. " 
, " " "[5~'4' J' ] , -: ..... . . :, . .. . "':'<0 ". , . .. . '.~..: 
,. . ...:' " " . :~ .' ~::f': ~ 
.. : .. ' .. ' :. 
, " . " 
. -. " ... .- ".! • . 
-, ,-
. . ;.. . .. ~ 
' . . .. : .. . 
. : .... ,,' .... , . " 
. .. :, ..... 
" 
t • • '. '.~' ' :. ' . . " . ' r ", •. 
" ' " 
t~ . '. . .. ,~. ;-.. . . . : ~' :' .. :'~. ' : '. 
;;. ~ -' , . . :~> .. ' " '~ ... ' .. ;: :'<' , 
. " , .;. 
, < ' 
. " 
r';;i,~ Affe~'t~d by tbe J;tes~u~~~Majrageni~~t Act ' 
' :,' ' . .- . ' . ' . . . . . 
; '.' . . 
ONE MONTH 
, [162(3)T&CPA]* 
TIME UNKNOWN ' 
Application referred back 
t? applicants 
